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INTRODUCTION 
She's never going to wake up. The words pound in Ms. Ayash's head 
as she sits in Kfar Sava's Meir Hospital, clutching her daughter's lifeless 
hand. 1 Ms. Ayash has been in the same seat for the past ten days staring at 
her daughter, ventilators coiled around her body like translucent snakes. Ms. 
Ayash replays the memories of the past seventeen years all leading up to the 
morning ten days ago when she rushed to the hospital after learning that her 
daughter had been hit by a car.2 She fiddles with the organ donation card she 
had been given by the nurses and reads the potential donations like a shop-
ping list. Ms. Ayash suddenly stops reading. Maybe, some way, I can have 
my daughter back. When the doctor returns to the room, Ms. Ayash slowly 
and solemnly lists the organs she wants donated.3 As the doctor is preparing 
to leave, Ms. Ayash quickly adds and I would like to save my daughter's 
I. See Israeli Woman's Eggs Can Be Harvested and Frozen After Her Death, 
Court Rules, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 8, 2011, 7:01 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ 
20 11/08/08/israeli-woman-eggs-harvested-frozen-death _ n_921639 .html [hereinafter Israeli 
Woman's Eggs Can Be Harvested]. On July 24, 2011, Chen Aida Ayash, a seventeen year 
old girl residing in the Sharon region in Israel was hit by a car. /d. Ten days after the acci-
dent, she died in the Kfar Sava Meir Hospital. !d. The following paragraph is a fictional 
account of the events that occurred in the interim period between Chen Aida Ayash's acci-
dent and her case before the Kfar Sava Magistrates to determine whether her parents could 
posthumously harvest her eggs while she was still connected to life support. 
2. Harriet Sherwood, Israeli Family Can Freeze Eggs of Daughter Killed in Road 
Accident, GUARDIAN (Aug. 8, 2011), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/aug/08/israeli-
family-can-freeze-eggs-daughter. 
3. See Israeli Woman's Eggs Can Be Harvested, supra note I (stating that "[a]fter 
deciding to donate her organs, Ayash's family obtained an order from the Kfar Sava Magis-
trate's Court to allow her eggs to be harvested and frozen"). 
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eggs.4 The doctor is puzzled, as is Ms. Ayash after the words escape her 
lips. The doctor leaves the room, assuring Ms. Ayash he will return momen-
tarily, after ascertaining whether it is legally and ethically permissible to do 
something that has until recently been medically impossible. 
On August 7, 2011, the presiding magistrates in Kfar Sava, Israel set 
global legal precedent by allowing Chen Aida Ayash's parents to posthu-
mously harvest and freeze her eggs.5 Ayash's parents intended to give the 
frozen eggs to a childless family member for later fertilization.6 There have 
been cases throughout the world7 where a woman has been granted permis-
sion by the judicial system to use her deceased husband's sperm, harvested 
and cryopreserved while he was still alive, to impregnate herself after his 
death.8 Medical technology has now advanced to a point where it is possible 
for an individual's gametic material to be retrieved after his or her death.9 
However, because these technological advances are so recent, the decision 
of whether to harvest gametic material from the deceased has only been 
addressed by emergency room doctors and urologists; 1° Chen Aida Ayash's 
4. See Sherwood, supra note 2. 
5. Id Maayan Maor, a spokesperson for the medical center in Kfar Sava stated, 
"This is a unique case, since this is the first time an Israeli court has approved the extraction 
and freezing of ovarian eggs from a dead woman." /d.; see also Ryan Jaslow, Dead Girl's 
Family Harvests Her Eggs: Was It Unethical?, CBSNEWS.COM (Aug. II, 2011, 3:52PM), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-504763_162-20091343-10391704.html (discussing how the 
case set important legal precedent for families seeking to seek continuity after the death of a 
family member). 
6. /d. Jaslow noted that after the court order was granted, Ayash's family decided 
to discontinue their attempt to utilize Chen's frozen eggs. Id. 
7. Since 1980, numerous requests for PGR have been made throughout the world. 
See R. Landau, Posthumous Sperm Retrieval for the Purpose of Later Insemination or IVF in 
Israel: An Ethical and Psychosocial Critique, 19 HUM. REPROD. 1952, 1952-56 (2004) (dis-
cussing PGR in Israel); J. Dostal et al., Post-Mortem Sperm Retrieval in New European 
Union Countries: Case Report, 20 HUM. REPROD. 2359, 2359-61 (2005) (discussing PMSR 
in Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, 
and Slovenia); Rebecca Collins, Posthumous Reproduction and the Presumption Against 
Consent in Cases of Death Caused by Sudden Trauma, 30 J. MED. & PHIL. 431, 432 (2005) 
(discussing posthumous reproduction in Australia). 
8. See discussion infra Sections I.A-B. This process is known as premortem gam-
ete cryopreservation where an individual harvests and preserves his gametes prior to death. 
See id. 
9. See discussion infra Section I.A. See generally CHRISTOPHER J. DE JONGE & 
CHRISTOPHER L.R. BARRATT, ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY: ACCOMPLISHMENTS 
AND NEW HORIZONS 411 (2002) (discussing the various advancements in medical technology 
and how they are utilized within the ART context). 
10. See RAY D. MADOFF, IMMORTALITY AND THE LAW: THE RISING POWER OF THE 
AMERICAN DEAD 46 (20 I 0) (discussing how requests for posthumous sperm retrieval are 
being made with increasing frequency); see, e.g., Plaintiffs Mem. of Law in Support of Her 
Emergency Mot. for a T.R.O. at I, Dhanoolal v. U.S. Dep't of the Army, No. 4:08-CV-42 
(CDL) (M.D. Ga. Apr. 4, 2008) (arguing that deceased's wife could have the deceased's 
sperm removed before his body was embalmed because he explicitly stated he wished to 
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case was the first known instance where a court ruled on whether a de-
ceased's gametic material could be retrieved after death. 11 
Much of the current scholarship on posthumous gamete retrieval 
(PGR) advocates for a total ban on the procedure in instances where the 
deceased's consent to posthumous parentage has not been specifically stated 
prior to death. 12 Scholars supporting a ban on the procedure have expressed 
concern that PGR would make a deceased individual a parent absent a prop-
er inquiry into whether he or she wanted to become a parent posthumous-
ly.13 However, the scholarly evasion of the PGR issue has left no solutions 
have children). The American Society for Reproductive Medicine supports the position that 
postmortem harvesting of gametes should be prohibited absent the donor's prior consent. 
Joshua S. Rubenstein, Advances in Medical Technology, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 7, 1999, at 9, II. 
The New York State Task Force on Life and the Law has stated that PGR, specifically sperm 
retrieval, should not be permitted without the written consent of the person from whom the 
sperm would be harvested. N.Y. STATE TASK FORCE ON LIFE AND THE LAW, ASSISTED 
REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PUBLIC POLICY 266 
( 1998). However, the Task Force did note: 
[I]n most states, the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act allows next-of-kin to consent to 
the retrieval of organs ... , unless there is evidence that the decedent would not 
have consented. It is arguable that these statutes would authorize the posthumous 
retrieval of sperm ... in the absence of a clear objection by the subject before he 
died. 
/d. (citing N.Y. PUB. HEALTH §§ 4300-4310 (McKinney 2007)); see also discussion infra 
Section LA. 
11. Courts have addressed what is to be done with gametic material after it has been 
harvested from an individual while they were alive but have since died. See discussion infra 
Subsection II.A.l. 
12. See, e.g., Charles P. Kindregan, Jr., Genetically Related Children: Harvesting of 
Gametes from Deceased or Incompetent Persons, 7 J. HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL L. 147, 151 
(2011) (arguing that "[t]he fact that a dead or incompetent person has arranged to have their 
gametes cryopreserved does not of itself mean that others ... can legally retrieve them, ferti-
lize them, or transfer them to produce a pregnancy. The prior consent of the deceased or 
incompetent person to use the preserved gametes is still needed"); Carson Strong, Ethical 
and Legal Aspects of Sperm Retrieval After Death or Persistent Vegetative State, 27 J.L. 
MED. & ETHICS 347, 348 (1999) (arguing that "reasonably inferred consent provides a basis 
for respecting patient autonomy--and not that reasonably inferred consent makes postmor-
tem sperm retrieval ethically justifiable"); Gladys B. White, Commentary, Legal and Ethical 
Aspects of Sperm Retrieval, 27 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 359,360 (1999) (disagreeing with Carson 
Strong's consideration of reasonably inferred consent and advocating posthumous sperm 
retrieval in instances only when explicit prior consent has been given with the exception in 
the case ofPVS if the wife is still married to the husband and cannot remarry). 
13. See, e.g., David M. Greer eta!., Case 21-2010: A Request for Retrieval ofOo-
cytes from a 36 Year-Old Woman with Anoxic Brain Injury, 363 N. ENG. J. MED. 276, 279, 
281 (2010) (noting that "[t]he law does not force a person to become a parent without his or 
her consent"); Frances R. Batzer, Joshua M. Hurwitz & Arthur Caplan, Postmortem 
Parenthood and the Need for a Protocol with Posthumous Sperm Procurement, 79 FERTILITY 
& STERILITY 1263, 1265 (2003) (arguing that "[i]t is already highly controversial ... to har-
vest sperm for future fatherhood solely on the basis of inferred consent. Even if a deceased 
Dying to Be Mommy 1335 
to the question of who should be the legal parent of a posthumously con-
ceived child. 14 The United States Supreme Court was recently baffled by the 
legal status of a posthumously conceived child in the case of Astrue v. Ca-
pato.15 The Court was asked to consider whether a posthumously conceived 
child qualified as a "child" under the Social Security Act for obtaining ben-
efits.16 However, the Court could not fmd any clues within the Social Secu-
rity Act about whether a qualifying child had to be conceived prior to the 
death of the deceased. 17 Ultimately, the Court evaded the issue and left it up 
to individual states to decide whether a posthumously conceived child 
should be considered a child of the deceased for Social Security purposes. 18 
Although scholars raise legitimate concerns about making the de-
ceased a legal parent against his or her wishes, 19 many have failed to con-
sider that there are alternative models of parentage establishment in which 
the gamete provider would not be considered the legal parent of the result-
ing child. 20 Thus, all of the fears surrounding unascertained consent would 
mean strongly desired children while still alive, it is not clear whether this desire cements his 
intent once dead"). 
14. The parentage question raises serious implications in other areas of law includ-
ing whether the resulting child could inherit from the deceased gametic provider, his family, 
and his estate. See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE§ 2-103 (2012) (stating that "[a]ny part of the 
intestate estate not passing to a decedent's surviving spouse ... passes ... to the decedent's 
descendants by representation"); Woodward v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 760 N.E.2d 257, 259 
(Mass. 2002) (holding that children could inherit if wife showed that "decedent affirmatively 
consented to posthumous conception and to the support of any resulting child"). For a dis-
cussion of the legal problems surrounding tax laws, estate planning, and possible inheritance 
rights of a posthumously conceived child, see Lori B. Andrews, The Legal Status of the 
Embryo, 32 LOY L. REv. 357, 392-95 (1986); John D. Battersby, Woman Is Carrying Her 
Daughter's Babies, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 1987, at A9 (discussing the legitimacy of triplets 
carried by a South African woman who was implanted with the ova produced by her daugh-
ter and fertilized in vitro with her son-in-law's sperm). 
15. 132 S. Ct. 2021 (2012). 
16. /d. at 2026. 
17. /d. at 2027-28 (stating that "[u]nlike § 416(e)(2) and (3), which specifY the cir-
cumstances under which stepchildren and grandchildren quality for benefits, § 416(e)(l) 
lacks any elaboration"). 
18. /d. at 2034. 
19. See, e.g., Strong, supra note 12, at 352 (arguing that "[e]ven if the wife has legal 
authority to make decisions concerning the disposition of his body, ethically, that authority 
ought not extend to include a right to have sperm removed from his body against his wish-
es"); Michael K. Elliott, Tales of Parenthood from the Crypt: The Predicament of the Post-
humously Conceived Child, 39 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 47, 58 (2004) (noting that "[t]he 
prevailing view is that there must be consent and intent to reproduce posthumously on the 
part of the decedent. This can be evidenced by either an express writing or conduct and 
statements by the decedent"). 
20. In her article, Dying To Be a Father: Legal Paternity in Cases of Posthumous 
Conception, Ruth Zafran considers applying the Intentional Parentage Doctrine, or the Intent 
Model as she refers to it, to the posthumous conception or posthumous gamete retrieval 
context. 8 Hous. J. HEALTH L. & PoL'Y 47, 75 (2007). However, Zafran chooses to advocate 
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be alleviated if the deceased gamete provider would not even be considered 
the parent of the child in the first place. 21 The two most popular alternative 
models of parentage establishment, the Gestational and Intentional Parent-
age Doctrines, originated within the framework of surrogacy agreements. 22 
In jurisdictions applying alternative approaches, a genetic relationship with 
the child is only one way to establish legal parentage; legal parentage can 
also be established by means of giving birth or manifesting an intent to par-
ent.23 
Even though the number of scholars seeking a ban on PGR continues 
to increase, the reality is that requests for PGR are becoming more prevalent 
as medical technology advances.24 Currently, the decision of whether to 
grant a request for PGR is left entirely to individual hospitals' preferences 
and moral standards; the continued lack of PGR regulation will only further 
the disparity in how hospitals handle PGR requests.25 The more urgent issue 
that must be addressed before the PGR procedure is scientifically perfected 
is who should be considered the legal parent of a child born from a de-
ceased's gametes. The application of the Intentional Parentage Doctrine/6 
the definition of parenthood through the lens of the Relational Model, as posited by feminist 
ethicist and psychologist Carol Gilligan. /d. at 76. Zafran foregoes the application of the 
Intentional Parentage Doctrine because she views it as promoting the commodification of 
children and the supposed negotiation of a parent-child relationship. !d. at 75; see also Mary 
Lyndon Shanley, Collaboration and Commodification in Assisted Procreation: Reflections 
on an Open Market and Anonymous Donation in Human Sperm and Eggs, 36 L. & Soc'y 
REV. 257, 271-72 (2002) (arguing that a market could develop for gametes from individuals 
of certain physical characteristics which will result in differential compensation for the pro-
vider's gametes); see discussion infra Part III. 
21. See discussion infra Section IV.B. 
22. See discussion infra Section III.B. 
23. See discussion infra Section III.B. 
24. The first published report of sperm harvested from a neurologically dead man 
was by Rothman in 1980. See Batzer, Hurwitz & Caplan, supra note 13, at 1263 (citing C.M. 
Rothman, A Method for Obtaining Viable Sperm in the Postmortem State, 34 FERTILITY & 
STERILITY 512 (1980)). Between 1980 and 1995, there were a reported total of eighty-two 
requests at forty facilities across the United States. Joshua M. Hurwitz et al., Posthumous 
Sperm Procurement: An Update, 2002 FERTILITY & STERILITY S242 (2002). In 2002, there 
was a 60% increase in requests and a 68% increase in retrievals. !d. In addition, twenty-one 
facilities have since established formal policies. !d.; see discussion infra Section II. B. 
25. See Katheryn D. Katz, Parenthood from the Grave: Protocols for Retrieving and 
Utilizing Gametes from the Dead or Dying, 2006 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 289, 315-16 (raising in 
her conclusion the question of whether legislative intervention is needed or whether PGR 
procedure should remain solely a question of medical ethics); Marjorie Maguire Shultz, 
Reproductive Technology and Intent-Based Parenthood: An Opportunity for Gender Neu-
trality, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 297, 300 (arguing that the issue of procreation is profoundly linked 
with individual and societal beliefs and values). 
26. The Intentional Parentage Doctrine was first enunciated by the California Su-
preme Court in its 1993 decision of Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P .2d 776 (Cal. 1993). The John-
son court noted that under the California Uniform Parentage Act, technically both a gesta-
tional surrogate and an intended mother who donated her own eggs to the procedure could 
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traditionally applied by courts in the context of surrogacy agreements, to the 
current PGR debate will serve as a successful proxy for the deceased's un-
ascertained consent to the PGR procedure. The Intentional Parentage Doc-
trine will ensure that the former spouse is able to maintain his reproductive 
autonomy by being able to conceive and bear a child with the partner of his 
choice; at the same time, the doctrine makes certain that the deceased will 
not be considered a legal parent of the child because she lacks the requisite 
intent to raise the child as her own. 27 Therefore, because the deceased will 
not be considered a legal parent, she and her estate will be relieved of all the 
financial and parentage obligations that would otherwise be thrust upon the 
deceased if courts applied a parentage model that determined legal parent-
age by way of genetics. 
Part I addresses the historical background of posthumous reproduction 
and gamete retrieval, including scientific and legal advancements.28 Part II 
discusses the constitutional concerns created by the conflicting rights to 
procreate and avoid procreation, including the degree of constitutional pro-
tection, if any, that should be granted to a deceased individual.29 Part III 
examines the various doctrines courts have created to establish legal parent-
age within the surrogacy context, including the Intentional Parentage Doc-
trine. 30 Part IV then analyzes the weaknesses of the Genetic Contribution 
Doctrine as applied within the PGR context and advocates for the adoption 
of the Intentional Parentage Model to relieve the deceased and her estate of 
parental and financial obligations. Further, the Intentional Parentage Doc-
trine is applied to the three most common scenarios where PGR requests 
have been made to emergency room doctors and urologists. 
I. FROM SCIENCE FICTION TO REALITY: THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF 
CREATING LIFE AFTER DEATH 
Up until the late twentieth century, posthumous reproduction seemed 
to be a bizarre concept from a science fiction novel. However, medical 
technology has advanced to a point where both posthumous reproduction 
and PGR have the potential to become fairly common practices.31 While 
posthumous reproduction and PGR may at first sound like the same con-
both be considered the legal mothers under the terms of the Act: the surrogate by giving birth 
and the intended mother by consanguinity. !d. at 781. In resolving the parentage "tie," the 
California Supreme Court held that "when the two means do not coincide in one woman, she 
who intended to procreate the child-that is, she who intended to bring about the birth of a 
child that she intended to raise as her own-is the natural mother." /d. at 782. 
27. See discussion infra Subsection III.B.2. 
28. See discussion infra Sections LA-B. 
29. See discussion infra Subsections II.A.l-2; Section II.B. 
30. See discussion infra Part III. 
3 I . See discussion supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
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cept, it is impossible to fully understand the modem criticisms of PGR 
without fully understanding the difference between the two procedures. 
Furthermore, much of the much of the scholarly work on posthumous con-
ception has not been extended to the PGR context. 
A. Life After Death, the Difference Between Posthumous Reproduction and 
PGR 
Posthumous reproduction and PGR differ in two important regards: 
the ascertainment of consent to posthumous parentage prior to death and the 
complexity of a determination of legal parentage. First, consent to PGR has 
usually not been ascertained prior to death whereas in instances of posthu-
mous conception the fact that the deceased stored his or gametes before 
death provides some indicia of the desire to procreate. 32 Second, as dis-
cussed below,33 because the deceased's consent to PGR has not been at-
tained, the determination of legal parentage is much more complicated; tra-
ditional legal parentage responsibilities have the potential to rest with more 
than two people because the individual requesting the gametes may be in a 
relationship with or remarried to another individual.34 
1. Posthumous Reproduction: The Effortless Ability to Ascertain 
Consent 
Posthumous reproduction occurs when a child is born after one or both 
of the genetic parents has died.35 Historically, this occurred when a man 
impregnated a woman and then died before the child was bom.36 Consent to 
becoming a parent in this instance is fairly easy to ascertain because, as 
32. See also Katz, supra note 25, at 289 (arguing PGR is different from posthumous 
reproduction and conception because "it is usually non volitional and because the law gov-
erning the practice is so underdeveloped"); see also discussion infra Section II.A. 
33. See discussion infra Section II.A. 
34. See Katz, supra note 25, at 299 (stating that "[t]here is some legislative and 
judicial direction on issues such as inheritance after posthumous conception, the status of 
cryopreserved pre-embryos, and parentage when donated gametes are used to achieve preg-
nancy, but nothing specifically addresses PMGR"). 
35. John A. Robertson, Posthumous Reproduction, 69 IND. L.J. 1027, 1027 (1994) 
(noting that posthumous reproduction normally has arisen in instances where fathers die 
before the birth of their children and women die in childbirth). 
36. There have also been instances where some females have given birth after their 
deaths. See, e.g., Daniel Sperling, Maternal Brain Death, 30 AM. J.L. & MED. 453,455 n.16 
(2004) (noting that there are instances where irreversibly brain-damaged women are kept on 
life support so that their organs could be harvested for donation and that this could extend 
into the child-bearing context). For example, women have oftentimes been kept on life sup-
port so that a child may be carried to term and delivered. See, e.g., Infant Born to Dying 
Mother Dies As Result of Infection, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 13, 2005), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/09/13/nationaV13braindead.html. 
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scholars have noted, a man would likely know that a child could result from 
sexual intercourse.37 Under United States law, a child who was conceived 
while the father was alive but born after his death would be considered as if 
born during the father's life.38 Furthermore, the determination of parentage 
is also simple within the posthumous reproduction context-all scholars are 
in agreement that the legal parents of the resulting child are the two genetic 
parents, even if one of them has died prior to the birth of the child. 39 
2. Posthumous Conception: A More Perplexing Consent Standard 
While posthumous reproduction has been in existence for hundreds of 
years, posthumous conception has been defined as "the beginning of the 
human gestational process after the death of one or both biological par-
ents."40 The posthumous conception process resulted from the technological 
advancements in artificial insemination methods-particularly the ability to 
freeze and preserve human gametes through the process of cryopreserva-
tion.41 Premortem gamete cryopreservation and posthumous conception 
historically arose in two instances: men going off to war42 and patients be-
ginning chemotherapy.43 In many of these instances, an individual will have 
37. Katz, supra note 25, at 291 (noting that "[c]onception in these cases was pur-
poseful in the sense that the male was aware that a pregnancy might result from his act of 
sexual intercourse"). 
38. MADOFF, supra note I 0, at 40. 
39. /d. 
40. Gloria J. Banks, Traditional Concepts and Nontraditional Conceptions: Social 
Security Survivor's Benefits for Posthumously Conceived Children, 32 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 
251, 258 (1999) (citing Ronald Chester, Freezing the Heir Apparent: A Dialogue on Post-
mortem Conception, Parental Responsibility, and Inheritance, 33 Hous. L. REv. 967, 972-79 
(1996)). 
41. See Renee H. Sekino, Posthumous Conception: The Birth of a New Class, 8 B.U. 
J. Sci. & TECH. L. 362, 364-65 (2002) (arguing that "[b ]ecause of the lengthy period of time 
over which human semen, ova, and embryos may be preserved, children may be conceived 
after the death of a particular donor, raising numerous legal issues relating to parental rela-
tionship and intestate succession"); Monica Shah, Comment, Modern Reproductive Technol-
ogies: Legal Issues Concerning Cryopreservation and Posthumous Conception, 17 J. LEGAL 
MED. 547,550 (1996). 
42. Kristine S. Knaplund, Postmortem Conception and a Father's Last Will, 46 
ARIZ. L. REV. 91, 91 (2004) (detailing how men going to fight in the Iraq and Gulf Wars 
deposited their sperm in banks in case they suffered infertility problems). The impetus be-
hind preserving sperm arises from a man's fear of dying while in combat or the concern that 
chemical or biological warfare will render him sterile. /d. Recently, women who are suffer-
ing from or undergoing treatment for a disease have opted to freeze either preembryos or 
their ovaries. /d.; see also Katheryn D. Katz, The Clonal Child: Procreative Liberty and 
Asexual Reproduction, 8 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 1, 35-39 (1997) (discussing cryopreservation 
of preembryos ). 
43. See generally Annika K. Schroder, Diedrich Klaus & Michael Ludwig, Strate-
gies for Preventing Chemotherapy and Radiotherapy Induced Gonadal Damage, 3 AM. J. 
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harvested and stored his sperm but not have left any instructions about what 
should become of the stored gametes in the event of death.44 Various court 
decisions have struggled to reconcile the absence of specific instructions 
with the donor's intention to procreate posthumously.45 While some courts 
have looked to the fact that the deceased froze his sperm during his lifetime 
as a possible indication that the individual desired to procreate,46 others have 
required a specific verbalization of a wish to use the frozen gametic material 
after death.47 
3. PGR: An Unascertainable Consent Standard? 
PGR, by contrast, occurs when an individual's gametic material is 
harvested after he or she has already passed away or is brain dead, coma-
tose, or in a persistent vegetative state. 48 Many PGR requests occur when 
the deceased dies in a tragic accident at a young age. 49 Although several 
hospitals have their own protocol when it comes to PGR requests,50 the law 
CANCER 97 (2004) (discussing the after-effects of chemotherapy and radiation on sperm 
count); Knaplund, supra note 42, at 91-92 (discussing other reasons why men would choose 
to deposit their sperm in banks). 
44. See In re Estate of Kievernagel, 166 Cal. Rptr. 3d 1024, I 025 (Ct. App. 2008) 
(holding that any indicia of decedent's intent with regard to the distribution of his gametic 
material controls as opposed to the intent of the deceased's widow). 
45. In response to many of the concerns surrounding posthumous reproduction, most 
sperm banks and hospitals now have consent forms that allow donors to provide instructions 
for the dispositions of the gametes if he or she dies. Michael R. Soules, Commentary, Post-
humous Harvesting of Gametes: A Physician's Perspective, 27 J. L. MED & ETHICS 362, 363 
(1999) (stating that "[i]n fact, the cryopreservation consent would be considered incomplete 
if it did not address the posthumous disposition of the sperm or embryos"). 
46. See Hecht v. Superior Court of Los Angeles, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275 (Ct. App. 
1993) {honoring the decision of a deceased male who froze his sperm and provided written 
instructions that it was to be given to a specific woman for implantation). 
47. See discussion infra Subsection II.A.I. 
48. See White, supra note 12, at 359. 
49. See Barron H. Lerner, In a Wife's Request at Her Husband's Deathbed, Ethics 
Are an Issue, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 7, 2004), http://www.nytimes.com/2004/09/07/health/ 
07essa.html; Susan Donaldson James, Sperm Retrieval: Mother Creates Life After Death, 
ABC NEWS (Feb. 23, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/Health/Wellness/mother-murdered-son-
hopes-create-grandchild-post-mortem/story?id=9913939; Christina Boyle, Slain Brooklyn 
G.!. Sgt. Dayne Darren Dhanoolal Could Still Be a Dad, NYDAILYNEWS.COM (Apr. 19, 
2009), http://www.nydailynews.com/news/world/slain-brooklyn-g-i-sgt-dayne-darren-dhano 
olal-a-dad-article-1.361713. 
50. For instance, the Department of Urology at Cornell University evaluates re-
quests for posthumous gamete retrieval on a case-by-case basis. New York Hospital Guide-
lines for Consideration of Requests for Post-mortem Sperm Retrieval, CORNELL UROLOGY, 
http://www.cornellurology.com/guidelines.shtml [hereinafter New York Hospital Guidelines] 
(last visited Jan. 23, 2013). The Department requires that each posthumous gamete retrieval 
request be evaluated by a panel of experts comprised of a psychologist, legal expert, institu-
tional representative, medical ethicist, and reproductive technology expert. !d. Furthermore, 
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governing the practice is significantly underdeveloped. Courts have yet to 
address whether PGR is even ethically permissible and, if it is, under what 
circumstances a PGR procedure can be performed. 5 1 
Although the area of posthumous reproduction is still in its legal in-
fancy, any developments in one area of the field can potentially be applied 
to a different area. PGR is quite different than posthumous reproduction and 
conception because there are normally not any outward indicia of consent. 
When an individual cryopreserves his or her gametes, there is normally 
some process whereby he or she can give instructions as to how the stored 
material should be deposited in the event of death. 52 In instances where re-
quests for PGR arise, however, doctors are not so fortunate to have explicit 
instructions regarding whether the deceased would have wanted to be a par-
ent posthumously. 
B. Scientific Advances in the Area of Female Gamete Harvesting 
Since 1999, more than 1,000 requests for PGR have been made each 
year.53 Additionally, twenty-one known facilities have established formal 
PGR policies. 54 The main scientific advancement that makes life after death 
even possible is cryopreservation, the freezing of the gametic material nec-
essary for reproduction. 55 Cryopreservation was first successfully used to 
freeze sperm in 195356 and then embryos several years later. 57 The first suc-
cessful pregnancy from a cryopreserved egg occurred in 1986.58 
each case is assessed on four criteria: issues of consent, medical contraindications, resource 
availability, and one-year waiting period for bereavement and recipient evaluation. !d. All of 
the proposals acknowledge that some form of premortem consent should be required, but 
differ on whether or not explicit consent is required. !d. 
51. See discussion supra notes 6-9 and accompanying text. 
52. See Soules, supra note 45, at 363 (noting the process by which sperm banks 
require additional information about the disposition of the sperm before it is cryopreserved). 
For an example of a standard disposition form, see Sperm Banking Preparation and Proce-
dures, U. WOMEN'S HEALTH CARE, http://www.kyinfertility.com/services/sperm-bank-
procedures.shtml (last visited Jan. 23, 2013). 
53. James, supra note 49. 
54. See Batzer, Hurwitz & Caplan, supra note 24, at 1263. 
55. JUDITH DAAR, REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES AND THE LAW 549 (2005) (detail-
ing the history of cryopreservation and current practices). 
56. Eric M. Walters et al., The History of Sperm Cryopreservation, in SPERM 
BANKING: THEORY AND PRACTICE 1, 4 (Allan A. Pacey & Mathew J. Tomlinson eds., 2009). 
57. CHARLES P. KINDREGAN, JR. & MAUREEN MCBRIEN, ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE 
TECHNOLOGY: A LAWYER's GUIDE TO EMERGING LAW AND SCIENCE 84 (2006). 
58. Ester Polak de Fried et al., Pregnancy After Human Donor Oocyte Cryopreser-
vation and Thawing in Association with Intracytoplasmic Sperm Injection in a Patient with 
Ovarian Failure, 69 FERTILITY & STERILITY 555, 556 (1998) (stating that"[ n ]early a decade 
has passed since the first reports of pregnancies following cryopreservation of human oo-
cytes were published"). 
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Sperm retrieval from men who are deceased, comatose, brain dead, or 
in a persistent vegetative state has been technically feasible since 1980.59 
PGR from a woman is much more medically complicated than from a man 
because of the requirement of advanced physical and hormonal prepara-
tion.60 In order to harvest eggs, medical personnel must induce artificial 
maturation of the eggs through ovarian stimulation using gonadotropin.61 
When the eggs have matured, they are then collected transvaginally with a 
needle.62 There has been no known case of its successful attempt.63 Further-
more, cryopreservation of unfertilized eggs is more difficult than cryopres-
ervation of fertilized eggs or embryos because of complications in freezing 
and successfully thawing the eggs,64 although the rate is now improving.65 
Even though there are lingering complications with the freezing of 
female gametic material, it is reasonable to conclude that the rapid ad-
vancement of medical technology will make posthumous retrieval of female 
gametic material a perfected reality. Therefore, it is necessary to begin ad-
dressing the various concerns that arise when a woman's eggs are posthu-
mously extracted and utilized for later fertilization. 
59. See Carson Strong, Consent to Sperm Retrieval and Insemination After Death or 
Persistent Vegetative State, 14 J.L. & HEALTH 243, 244 (2000) (discussing the first case of 
extracting sperm from a man's body following death in 1980). There are a variety of tech-
niques that can be used to extract the sperm from a deceased male including '"stimulated 
ejaculation, microsurgical epididymal sperm aspiration or testicular sperm extraction."' See 
Katz, supra note 25, at 293 (quoting The Ethics Committee of the American Society for 
Reproductive Medicine, Posthumous Reproduction, 82 FERTILITY & STERILITY. 260, 620 
(Supp. I Sept. 2004)). 
60. Greer eta!., supra note 13, at 280. "[T]he typical protocol for controlled ovarian 
hyperstimulation involves 7 to 10 days of gonadotropin stimulation before oocyte retrieval. 
The neurology ICU team would [need] to determine whether the patient could be supported 
for that length of time." Id. 
61. Michele Goodwin, Altruism's Limits: Law, Capacity, and Organ Commodifica-
tion, 56 RuTGERS L. REv. 305, 391-92 (2004) (detailing the procedures by which egg donors' 
eggs are matured and subsequently harvested). 
62. Id. at 392. Goodwin notes that the process "poses health risks as well as poten-
tial psychological side-effects," including "nausea, bloating, and depression." /d. 
63. Even though Chen Aida Ayash's parents were able to secure the court order 
allowing them permission to harvest Chen's eggs, they ultimately did not go through with the 
procedure. See Israeli Woman's Eggs Can Be Harvested, supra note I. 
64. See DAAR, supra note 55, at 561. 
65. Nicole Noyes, Eleonora Porcu & Andrea Borini, Over 900 Oocyte Cryopreser-
vation Babies Born with No Apparent Increase in Congenital Anomalies, 18 REPROD. 
BIOMEDICAL ONLINE 769, 769-76 (2009). 
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II. THE CONSTITUTION AND A FORMER SPOUSE'S RIGHT TO RETRIEVE AN 
EGG 
The first inquiry in determining whether or not PGR should even be 
permitted begins with an analysis of the constitutional rights at stake. In 
parentage cases within the paternity and assisted reproduction technology 
(ART) context, courts have examined competing privacy rights, notably the 
right to procreate versus the right not to procreate. 66 The PGR context is 
similar to instances of paternity establishment and ART because there are at 
least two individuals with competing constitutional interests: an individual 
who desires to procreate, whether it is the former spouse, significant other, 
or family member of the deceased, and the deceased, whose desire to pro-
create will most likely not be known at the time of his or her death.67 PGR 
adds an additional dimension to the constitutional debate: whether the rights 
of the deceased are comparable to or lesser than those of the living.68 
A. Privacy Rights and Procreational Autonomy 
The United States Supreme Court has never explicitly recognized a 
fundamental right to procreate, but has implied the right's existence since 
1923.69 The decision to have children is now considered a fundamental right 
covered by the constitutional right to privacy derived from the penumbras of 
the Constitution.70 Although the right to procreate was explicitly enunciated 
66. Additional constitutional conundrums that arise in the parentage context are the 
right to raise a child as one pleases as well as the rights of grandparents. See Meyer v. Ne-
braska, 262 U.S. 390, 399-400 (1923) (holding that parents have a fundamental right in 
choosing how to educate their children); Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 75 (2000) (holding 
that the interests of parents in the "care, custody, and control" of their children is a funda-
mental right that the state may not abridge without a compelling interest); see also discussion 
infra Subsections II.A.l-2. 
67. See discussion infra Section N.B-C. 
68. See discussion infra Section II.B. 
69. See Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399 (1923) ("Without doubt, [liberty] denotes not merely 
freedom from bodily restraint but also the right ·of the individual ... to marry, ... bring up 
children, ... and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized ... as essential to the 
orderly pursuit of happiness"); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 536 (1942) (holding that 
a forced sterilization law "deprives certain individuals of a right which is basic to the perpet-
uation of a race-the right to have offspring"). 
70. The initial enunciation of a fundamental right of privacy was set forth in Gris-
wold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 499 (1985). In Griswold, the Court invalidated a statute 
that made it a crime for a person to use any form of contraceptives. !d. at 480. The Court 
refused to defer to the legislature and noted that the law operated "directly on an intimate 
relation of husband and wife." /d. at 482. The right to privacy was then extended to unmar-
ried individuals in Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 443 (1972). The Court stated that "[i]f 
the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be 
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by the Court, it has been argued that this right should extend to noncoital 
methods that involve ART.71 The Supreme Court has not yet encountered 
the question of whether the right to procreate extends to the posthumous 
context. However, if the Court finds that it does, the Court will then be 
faced with the issue of whether a former spouse's or an infertile family 
member's interest in procreation can trump the unknown or contrary wishes 
of the deceased to not become the legal parent of the resulting child. 
1. The Desire to Be Mommy 
The concept of reproductive autonomy now includes the right to pro-
create,72 the right to purchase condoms,73 and the right to choose to have an 
abortion.74 These recognized rights, however, fall within the context of coi-
tal reproduction. 75 It is unknown whether these rights would be the same in 
the context of noncoital reproduction.76 The Supreme Court has recognized 
that the right of privacy belongs to the individual-as opposed to the couple 
as a unit.77 Thus, issues arise when individuals have different procreative 
interests. 
free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a 
person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child." I d. at 453. 
71. See Stephanie F. Schultz, Comment, Surrogacy Arrangements: Who Are the 
"Parents" of a Child Born Through Artificial Reproductive Techniques?, 22 OHIO. N.U. L. 
REV. 273,274, 276-81 (1995) (arguing that the interests the Court is protecting in the context 
of privacy and procreation are still involved in the noncoital reproductive context). 
72. The fundamental right to procreate was first recognized by the United States 
Supreme Court in Skinner v. Oklahoma where the Court struck down a mandatory steriliza-
tion law for third time criminal offenders. 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942). The Court recognized 
marriage and procreation as "the basic civil rights of man." /d. In Stanley v. Illinois, the 
Court determined that an unmarried father had a right to rear his children, stating that "[t]he 
rights to conceive and to raise one's children have been deemed 'essential,' 'basic civil rights 
of man,' and 'rights far more precious ... than property rights."' 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) 
(internal citations omitted). 
73. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 447 (1972) (extending a married individual's right to 
purchase contraceptives to a single person). 
74. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 166-67 (1973) (holding that a woman has the right 
to choose to have an abortion before viability and to obtain it without undue interference 
from the State); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 834 (1992) (upholding Roe v. 
Wade's essential holding that a woman had the right to choose to have an abortion before 
fetal viability without undue interference from the state). 
75. See Lawrence Wu, Family Planning Through Human Cloning: Is There a Fun-
damental Right?, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1461, 1474 (1998) (arguing that using ARTs to procre-
ate should receive the same protections as coital reproduction). 
76. See Elliott, supra note 19, at 55-56. Elliott notes that "[t]he Supreme Court never 
has distinctively addressed whether an individual has a constitutional right to posthumous 
reproduction. Nor has the Court ever addressed the rights of children born through posthu-
mous reproductive methods." Id. at 56. 
77. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453. 
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Lower courts have noted that a deceased individual has an interest in 
how his or her gametes are used after death if he or she manifested a specif-
ic intention of how the gametes should be used while alive. 78 For example, 
in Hecht v. Superior Court of Los Ange/es/9 the California Court of Appeals 
did not have a difficult time ascertaining the deceased's wishes with regard 
to posthumous reproduction. Prior to committing suicide, William Kane had 
fifteen vials of his sperm stored at the local sperm bank:.8° Kane made sever-
al recorded statements that he wanted his sperm to be given to his girlfriend, 
Deborah Hecht, so that she could become pregnant with their children. 81 
Kane's two children challenged his decision to leave his sperm to Hecht, 
arguing that (1) a posthumously born child would disrupt their existing fam-
ily structure for inheritance purposes, (2) the posthumously born child 
would suffer because he would not be raised in a traditional family home 
with both parents, and (3) if Hecht were impregnated with Kane's sperm it 
would violate public policy because the two were unmarried.82 The court 
ruled against the children's arguments and instead focused on Kane's ex-
plicit intent to procreate after death.83 The Hecht court ultimately concluded 
that posthumous conception was not contrary to public policy.84 
Thus, it appears as though some courts are willing to honor the de-
ceased's interest to procreate after death when this interest coincides with 
the interests of the living. However, cases of PGR, when the consent of the 
deceased normally has not been obtained, raise more difficult questions. 
Should the court presume that the deceased would have wanted children 
during his or her lifetime? What if the living former spouse never had the 
78. See Woodward v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 760 N.E.2d 257, 259 (Mass. 2002) 
(holding that the deceased father's reproductive autonomy should be respected when ascer-
taining whether children born years after his death using frozen sperm should be declared his 
heirs). 
79. 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275 (Ct. App. 1993). 
80. !d. at 276. 
81. !d. Kane also executed a will in which he stated that it was his wish for Hecht to 
"become impregnated with [his] sperm, before or after [his] death." !d. at 277. The will also 
referenced "our future child or children." !d. Further, Kane wrote a letter to his future not-
yet-conceived children, in which he stated: "I've been assiduously generating frozen sperm 
samples .... [T]his letter is for my posthumous offspring ... with the thought that I have 
loved you in my dreams, even though I never got to see you born." !d. (internal quotations 
omitted). 
82. See id. at 279, 284. 
83. See id. at 291. The Hecht court noted that '" [i]t is not the role of the judiciary to 
inhibit the use of reproductive technology when the Legislature has not seen fit to do so; any 
such effort would raise serious questions in light of the fundamental nature of the rights of 
procreation and privacy."' !d. 290-91 (quoting Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 787 
(1993)). 
84. See id. at 287, 290-91. The case then went back to the probate court for a deter-
mination on how Kane's frozen sperm should be distributed. Kane v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 578, 580 (Ct. App. 1995). 
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opportunity to have a child with the deceased? Should the living former 
spouse be prevented from having children even though the deceased will 
have no obligations to the child? 
2. The Desire Not to Be Mommy 
The Supreme Court first recognized a right to contraception as an el-
ement of marital privacy in 1965.85 The right to contraception is generally 
regarded as the right to decide "whether to bear or beget a child. "86 In most 
cases of artificial reproduction, both parties consent to procreation.87 How-
ever, if the parties are in disagreement, courts must weigh the relative inter-
ests of the parties.88 The situation is further complicated in instances ofPGR 
where courts will have to consider whether the freedom not to procreate 
posthumously is more or less important than the freedom not to procreate 
while the person is still alive. 
The Tennessee Supreme Court in Davis v. Davis recognized that while 
the right to procreate is a fundamental right, it must be balanced against the 
right not to procreate.89 Davis involved a dispute between a recently di-
vorced husband and wife over the ownership of their cryopreserved 
preembryos.90 The couple had deposited the preembryos at an IVF clinic but 
did not execute an agreement as what would become of any unused embry-
os.91 The court attempted to balance Junior Davis's right not to procreate 
85. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965). 
86. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (holding that "[i]f the right of 
privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from 
unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the 
decision whether to bear or beget a child"). 
87. Most clinics throughout the United States require spouses to sign informed con-
sent forms for a number of different assisted reproductive technology procedures including in 
vitro fertilization, intracytoplasmic sperm injection, and embryo cryopreservation. See In-
formed Consent for Assisted Reproduction, WOMEN'S HEALTH AT MAGNOLIA PARKE 
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA available at http://repro.med.ufl.edu/docs/form_sartconsent. In 
2010, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention reported 147,260 ART cycles per-
formed. Assisted Reproductive Technology, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND 
PREVENTION, available at http://www.cdc.gov/art/ (lasted visited March 21, 2012). The great 
majority of these cases result in no legal repurcussions. 
88. Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 604 (Tenn. 1992). The Davis court noted that 
ordinarily the individual who sought to avoid procreation would normally prevail in the 
balancing inquiry if the party who desired procreation had other means and opportunities to 
procreate. ld; see also Litowitz v. Litowitz, 48 P.3d 261, 269 (Wash. 2002) (holding that the 
egg donor could not prevent the man from donating preembryos to another couple); Kass v. 
Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174, 182 (N.Y. 1998) (holding that courts needed to consider the intent 
manifested in the consent agreement). 
89. 842 S.W.2d at 604. 
90. Id 
91. Id at 590. 
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with the right of Mary Sue Davis, who wanted to use the preembryos either 
to implant herself or to donate them.92 
The court acknowledged that Mary Sue Davis's right to procreate 
would normally have trumped Junior Davis's desire not to procreate.93 For 
this proposition, the Davis court cited the Supreme Court's rationale in 
Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth that stated '"inasmuch 
as it is the woman who physically bears the child and who is the more di-
rectly and immediately affected by the pregnancy, as between the two, the 
balance weighs in her favor. "'94 However, the court ultimately held that 
Junior's right not to procreate prevailed in this instance because Mary Sue 
Davis wanted to donate the preembryos to a couple as opposed to using 
them herself.95 The Tennessee court stressed the importance of considering 
each case on its individual facts and even giving weight to the unique per-
sonalities of the parties.96 The court also noted that ifMary Sue was allowed 
to donate the preembryos, Junior "would face a lifetime of either wondering 
about his parental status or knowing about his parental status but having no 
control over it."97 Importantly, the Davis court stated that even if other 
courts balanced an individual's desire to procreate against the desire not to 
procreate, the Davis decision should not stand for the rule of an automatic 
veto on the ability to procreate. 98 
Although at first glance these decisions may imply that the right not to 
procreate would trump the desire to procreate, courts must consider the fact 
that if the living individual, a spouse, significant other, or family member 
specifically desires the genetic material of the deceased to create a child, 
there may not be any alternative avenues to create a child with the genetics 
92. !d. The case began as a divorce proceeding and all issues were resolved except 
Junior Davis's objection to the use of the preembryos where he stated "that he preferred to 
leave the embryos in their frozen state until he decided whether or not he wanted to become a 
parent outside the bounds of marriage." !d. at 589. 
93. !d. 
94. !d. at 601 n.24 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 
52, 71 (1976)). 
95. !d. at 604. The court noted that the "[d]onation, if a child came of it, would rob 
him twice-his procreational autonomy would be defeated and his relationship with his 
offspring would be prohibited." !d. 
96. !d. at 603-04. The court considered the fact that Junior Davis had a rough up-
bringing and was vehemently opposed to fathering a child that would not live with both 
parents. Id. at 603. 
97. Id. at 604. 
98. !d. The rationale used in Davis was adopted by a New Jersey appellate court that 
allowed a wife to destroy the frozen embryos after the termination of the marriage, even 
though her husband wanted to use the embryos with another woman. J.B. v. M.B., 751 A.2d 
613, 619-20 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2000). In reaching its conclusion, the New Jersey 
court stated that the wife's desire to avoid procreation would not impair the husband's right 
to procreate because he still retained the capacity to father children. !d. at 619. 
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and bloodline of the deceased.99 Some scholars have argued that the desire 
to avoid procreation should not be considered unless the deceased left spe-
cific instructions. 100 
B. Are There Rights Beyond the Grave? 
What if Mary Sue Davis had petitioned the Tennessee Supreme Court 
to use Junior Davis's sperm after he was deceased? Or what if he had al-
ready died and her wishes of having children were thwarted? PGR introduc-
es an additional layer of unique and competing constitutional claims. Not 
only must the freedom to procreate be weighed against the freedom not to 
procreate, but an additional consideration must be given to whether a per-
son's constitutional claim has more or less merit because he or she is de-
ceased.101 This inquiry has split critics. 102 In several case studies where med-
ical personnel have considered performing PGR when the deceased's con-
sent to the procedures was unknown, bioethicists have noted that once a 
patient is dead, "any right she may have had to direct and control how she is 
treated by physicians and nurses ceases with her death."103 Although courts 
have not addressed the varying degrees of constitutional rights in the con-
text of posthumous genetic harvesting, they have done so in other legal con-
texts. 
1. Rights Within the Civil Rights Context 
In Whitehurst v. Wright, 104 the Fifth Circuit considered whether a 
mother could bring suit on behalf of her deceased son for deprivation of his 
99. See discussion infra Subsection IV .C. I. 
100. See Robertson, supra note 35, at 1039-40 (arguing that "the question of the 
donor's right to reproduce posthumously arises only if he had issued instructions that con-
templated posthumous use of his sperm .... (U]nless he had issued a directive that the stored 
semen be destroyed, his right to avoid posthumous reproduction would not be involved"). 
101. See Strong, supra note 12, at 352. Carson Strong muses that in cases where a 
wife requests procedures in opposition to a man's reasonably inferred desire that they not be 
performed, freedom not to procreate posthumously is less important than freedom not to 
procreate while the individual is still alive although considerations of physical manipulation 
of the body and other avenues available to the wife should be given significant weight. /d. 
I 02. Compare Katz, supra note 25, at 312 (arguing that if an individual expressed an 
intention to not procreate, those wishes should be honored much like how we honor testa-
mentary provisions concerning the disposition of property), with James M. Jordan III, Note, 
Incubating for the State: The Precarious Autonomy of Persistently Vegetative and Brain-
Dead Pregnant Women, 22 GA. L. REV. 1103, 1108-12 (1988) (discussing University Health 
Service, Inc. v. Piazzi where the court held that the constitutional rights of a brain-dead preg-
nant woman were extinguished at death). 
I 03. Arthur Izak Applbaum et al., A Family's Request for Complimentary Medicine 
After Patient Brain Death, 299 J. AM. MED. Ass'N 2188, 2190 (2008). 
I 04. 592 F.2d 834 (5th Cir. 1979). 
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Fifth, Sixth, Thirteenth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights after he was 
murdered as part of an alleged police conspiracy. 105 The district court found 
that Whitehurst's § 1983 106 action was nonexistent because the claim was 
brought subsequent to his death and, thus, he could not be deprived of any 
constitutional rights. 107 Furthermore, the court also found that there was no § 
1985(3)108 claim because it was extinguished upon Whitehurst's death and 
could not be established retroactively. 109 The Fifth Circuit affirmed the low-
er court's holding, stating that "[a]fter death, one is no longer a person with-
in our constitutional and statutory framework, and has no rights of which he 
may be deprived."no Subsequent decisions have held that while claims may 
be viable if the deceased had been alive at the initiation of the proceedings, 
any constitutional rights were extinguished at death. 111 
Doctor Susan Kerr has equated the constitutional rights of the dead 
with the constitutional rights of a fetus in the context of Roe v. Wade.ll2 
Kerr and the Fifth Circuit in Whitehurst noted that Roe held that a fetus is 
not considered a person under the Fourteenth Amendment and, therefore, 
has no rights. 113 The defendants in Whitehurst argued that because a fetus 
/d. 
105. /d. at 836-37. 
106. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) provides: 
Every person who, under color of any statute ... subjects, or causes to be subject-
ed, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof 
to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitu-
tion and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law. 
107. Whitehurst, 592 F.2d at 837. 
108. Section 1985(3) provides: 
[I]f one or more persons [in any State or Territory] engaged therein do, or cause to 
be done, any act in furtherance of the object of such conspiracy, whereby another is 
injured in his person or property, or deprived of having and exercising any right or 
privilege of a citizen of the United States, the party so injured or deprived may 
have an action for the recovery of damages occasioned by such injury or depriva-
tion, against any one or more of the conspirators. 
109. Whitehurst, 592 F.2d at 837. 
110. /d. at 834. 
111. See Estate of Conner v. Ambrose, 990 F. Supp. 606, 618 (N.D. Ind. 1997) (dis-
trict court dismissed a § 1983 lawsuit against coroner, for improperly performing an autopsy, 
stating that "[a] person's civil rights may only be violated while that person is alive. After 
death, one is no longer a 'person' within our constitutional and statutory framework and has 
no rights of which he may be deprived" (citations omitted)); Ford v. Moore, 237 F.3d 156, 
165 (2d Cir. 2001) (stating that "[e]ven if there were a viable claim against Moore for con-
duct after Ford's death, the death would have extinguished any claim of Ford's"); Helmer v. 
Middaugh, 191 F. Supp. 2d 283 (N.D.N.Y. 2002) (dismissing all constitutional claims 
against a defendant whose only involvement in the alleged violation occurred after the dece-
dent's death). 
112. Susan Kerr, Postmortem Sperm Procurement: Is it Legal?, 3 DEPAUL J. HEALTH 
CAREL. 39, 47 (1999). 
113. Whitehurst, 592 F.2d at 840 n.9 ("Neither party has pointed to any case that 
recognizes or refuses to recognize the civil rights of a corpse. Appellees' brief, however, 
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does have potential for life in the future, a corpse, which has no potential for 
life in the future, does not have any constitutional rights. 114 
2. Rights Within Other Contexts 
While the deceased may not have any judicially recognizable rights 
within the civil rights contexts, scholars have advocated for recognition in 
other areas oflaw. Professor Anne Reichman Schiff has argued that "certain 
acts committed after a person's death can harm that individual's interests, 
despite the fact that the person no longer exists and is therefore unaware of 
the occurrence."115 Scholars have noted that while a body may not have civil 
rights, the practice of disposing a deceased's body and property according 
to his or her wishes is still honored. 116 Thus, individuals advocating that the 
rights of the dead extend into the procreative context argue that while the 
living spouse does have the freedom to procreate, this freedom should be 
trumped by the rights of the deceased to remain free from posthumous phys-
ical manipulation and the potential desire to not be a parent. 117 
3. Right to Procreate Amongst the Living and the Dead 
Only a few scholars have considered the comparability of procreative 
rights between the living and the dead. Professor John Robertson of the 
does call to our attention Roe v. Wade, which found that a fetus is not a person under the 14th 
amendment and has no rights thereunder. From that principle, appellees forcefully argue that 
if a being capable of sustaining life in the future is not a person, a fortiori, a corpse, having 
no potential for life is not a person within the protection of our constitution. The argument 
that a corpse has no civil rights is further strengthened by the treatment of actions involving 
interference with dead bodies .... Although a cause of action exists in each situation, the 
claim belongs to the survivor of the deceased. If the corpse were an entity capable of pos-
sessing rights, the action would belong to him or to his personal representative." (citations 
omitted)). See also Kerr, supra note 112, at 48 (1999) (arguing that even though Roe and 
Whitehurst hold that corpses lack constitutional rights, society still cannot do whatever it 
pleases with the deceased's body). 
114. Whitehurst, 592 F.2d at 840 n.9. 
115. Anne Reichman Schiff, Arising from the Dead: Challenges of Posthumous Pro-
creation, 75 N.C. L. REV. 901,939 (1997). 
116. See Strong, supra note 12, at 349 (stating that "freedom can be implicated in 
postmortem procreation .... [W]hen one makes a request while alive to have one's gametes 
used (or not used) for procreative purposes after death, or to have gestation continue (or not 
continue) after death, it is appropriate to speak of procreative freedom"); Katz, supra note 
25, at 312 (stating that "[i]f an individual has expressed clear intention to procreate with a 
particular individual or not to procreate, then those wishes should be honored in the same 
way that testamentary provisions receive deference"). 
117. Strong, supra note 12, at 352. Strong argues that "[e]ven ifthe wife has legal 
authority to make decisions concerning disposition of [the deceased's] body, ethically, that 
authority ought not extend to include a right to have sperm removed from his body against 
his wishes." ld. 
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University of Texas has argued that the freedom to procreate after death has 
little importance. 118 Robertson points out that experiences associated with 
procreation after death are "so attenuated that one could argue it is not an 
important reproductive experience at all."119 In contrast, Professor Carson 
Strong of the University of Tennessee College of Medicine has argued that 
there are other aspects of procreation other than those associated with ges-
tating and rearing children that make it meaningful to participants. 120 There-
fore, Strong concludes that even though the dead may not have the same 
rights as the living, there should be some weight given to a deceased indi-
vidual's desire to avoid procreation, even after death.' 21 
The questions that arise concerning procreative autonomy do not typi-
cally arise in the paradigm of a married couple conceiving a child by coital 
reproduction. 122 Therefore, when reproduction occurs nontraditionally and 
noncoitally within the ART context, it is essential to consider whether the 
individuals' interests are the same. When a PGR request is made, the living 
individual is exercising his or her fundamental right to procreate. 123 As case 
law and some scholars suggest, the constitutional rights of the deceased are 
not on par with those of living. 124 Furthermore, the application of a nontradi-
tional model of parentage to the PGR context will indeed quell the fears of 
those who argue that PGR infringes upon both the constitutional right not to 
procreate and the deceased's interest in not becoming a legal parent post-
humously.125 
Ill. PICKING A MOMMY: MODELS OF PARENTAGE WITHIN THE ART 
CONTEXT 
The first case of PGR to garner international attention involved Diane 
Blood, a British woman whose husband died suddenly of meningitis in 
1995.126 While her husband was in a coma, Ms. Blood requested that doctors 
118. See Robertson, supra note 35, at 1032. 
119. Id 
120. See Strong, supra note 59, at 257. Strong cites the creation of a person, the af-
firmation of mutual love, and the desire to have a link to the future as reasons why individu-
als may desire to procreate after death. Id 
121. Id Strong notes that although "the argument for respecting freedom to procreate 
in the ordinary scenario is stronger than the argument for respecting freedom to procreate 
after death ... [and] decisions to attempt procreation after death ... can be meaningful to 
some persons." !d. 
122. See Robertson, supra note 35, at 1029. 
123. See discussion supra Subsection II.A.l. 
124. See supra text accompanying notes 106-14, 1138-19. 
125. See generally discussion infra Part III. 
126. R v. Human Fertilisation & Embryology Auth., ex parte Blood, [1997] 2 All 
E.R. 687 at 687 (Eng.). For a lengthier discussion of the case, see Margaret Foster Reilly & 
Richard A. Merrill, Regulating Reproductive Genetics: A Review of American Bioethics 
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remove Mr. Blood's sperm so that she could use it after his death. 127 The 
doctors complied with Ms. Blood's request for PGR, however, the Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology Authority denied Ms. Blood the opportunity 
to use the sperm for fertilization because Mr. Blood had not provided writ-
ten consent for his wife to use his sperm posthumously. 128 Furthermore, Ms. 
Blood also faced difficulty receiving court permission to place her deceased 
husband's name on the resulting children's birth certificates as the legal 
father. 129 The international publicity generated by Ms. Blood's effort to have 
children demonstrates how compelling the situation may be when a loved 
one dies before he or she has the chance to become a parent. 130 Unlike the 
heavy regulation of PGR internationally, requests for PGR in the United 
States currently occur in a legal void. 131 Many physicians in the United 
States have acceded to requests for PGR on the assumption that there were 
no significant legal ramifications. 132 
A troubling consequence of posthumously created children is the need 
to identify the legal parents of those children. 133 Just as Diane Blood wished 
to name her deceased husband on her children's birth certificates, so too 
will United States hospitals and courts struggle with determining legal par-
entage in cases of PGR without any judicial or legislative guidance. 134 With-
in the ART context, courts are currently split on which individuals involved 
Commissions and Comparison to the British Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority, 
6 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 1, 56-57 (2005) (discussing Blood in detail). 
127. Blood, 2 All E.R. at 687, 690. 
128. /d. Ultimately, Ms. Blood was permitted to use the sperm and gave birth to a son 
in December of 1998 and a second son in 2002. See CATHERINE BARNARD, THE SUBSTANTIVE 
LAW OF THE EU: THE FOUR FREEDOMS 366 (2d ed. 2007). The British Court of Appeal per-
mitted Ms. Blood to take the sperm to Belgium where she could use it for fertilization. See 
Blood, 2 All E.R. at 698, 701. Belgium did not require written consent from the deceased in 
order to use his sperm for posthumous conception and reproduction. See id. at 698. 
129. After Ms. Blood's first child was born, she had to register the father's name as 
"unknown" on the birth certificate. See Cherry Norton, At Last, Diane Blood Can Put the 
Name of Her Husband on Son's Birth Certificate, INDEP. (Aug. 25, 2000), 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/at-last-diane-blood-can-put-the-name-of-her-
husband-on-sons-birth-certificate-71 051 O.html. 
130. See discussion infra Subsections IV.C.l-3. 
131. See discussion supra Section I.A. 
132. See, e.g., Lori B. Andrews, The Sperminator, N.Y. TIMES MAG., March 28, 
1999, at 64 (highlighting anecdotal incidents involving patient requests for PGR). 
133. See supra text accompanying notes 127-39. 
134. See Browne Lewis, Graveside Birthday Parties: The Legal Consequences of 
Forming Families Posthumously, 60 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 1159, 1161 (2010) (noting that 
although courts and legislatures have attempted to remove the stigma associated with illegit-
imacy, non-marital children still face other legal barriers); Richard F. Storrow, The Policy of 
Family Privacy: Uncovering the Bias in Favor of Nuclear Families in American Constitu-
tional Law and Policy Reform, 66 Mo. L. REv. 527, 594 nn.467-71 (2001) (discussing legis-
lative and judicial actions to "align the treatment accorded nonmarital children with that 
accorded marital children"). 
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in the reproduction process should be considered a legal parent. 135 Case law 
addressing the debate between genetics, gestation, and intent currently rec-
ognize three women who can potentially be named the legal mothers of the 
resulting child: the genetic mother who donated the egg, 136 the gestational 
mother who gave birth to the child, 137 and the intended mother138 who, in 
many cases, bears neither a genetic nor gestational relationship with the 
child but through her deliberate actions precipitated the events that led to 
the conception of the child. 139 Therefore, in determining appropriate policies 
of permitting PGR, the doctrines of establishing legal maternity recognized 
in current case law can serve as potential guideposts in deciding whether or 
not to retrieve eggs from a deceased woman and can also provide examples 
of the potential effects PGR may have on the deceased. 
A. Genetic Mother as Legal Mother: The Genetic Contribution Doctrine 
In instances of coital reproduction, it is obvious that the woman who 
conceived and bore the child is his or her legal mother. 140 Within the ART 
context, however, there is potentially more than one woman involved in the 
reproductive process. 141 The Genetic Contribution Doctrine establishes legal 
parentage solely on the genetic relationship between the child and the indi-
vidual who provided the genetic material. 142 Courts that follow the Genetic 
Contribution Doctrine assert that even if the child is born from a gestational 
surrogate,l43 the woman who provides the child's "genetic imprint" should 
be considered the legal mother of the child unless she has relinquished or 
135. See supra text accompanying notes 126-39. 
136. See infra text accompanying notes 140--55. 
137. Discussion of the Gestational Model of parentage is beyond the scope of this 
note. For a general discussion on the doctrine, see John Lawrence Hill, What Does It Mean 
To Be a "Parent"? The Claims of Biology as the Basis for Parental Rights, 66 N.Y.U. L. 
REv. 353,394-400 (1991). 
138. See infra text accompanying notes 160--63. Intentional Parentage can further be 
analyzed in the context of Functional Parentage. See infra text accompanying notes 225-31. 
139. See infra text accompanying notes 160--63. 
140. Cf Robertson, supra note 35, at 1029. 
141. See supra text accompanying notes 135-39. 
142. See Hill, supra note 137, at 368-69 n.68 (coining the term Genetic Contribution 
Doctrine based off of the Baby M case in which the husband's genetic contribution to the 
child rendered him a "parent" under the court's analysis). See generally In re Baby M, 537 
A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988). 
143. A gestational surrogate is a woman who is implanted with the eggs of. another 
woman that have been retrieved and inseminated with sperm. Ardis L. Campbell, Annota-
tion, Determination of Status as Legal or Natural Parents in Contested Surrogacy Births, 77 
A.L.R. 5TH 567, 574 (2000). A traditional surrogate, on the other hand, is a woman whose 
own eggs are injected with the sperm of a man whose partner is unable to become pregnant. 
!d. 
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waived her parental rights. 144 Advocates of the Genetic Contribution Doc-
trine cite the significance of raising a child comprised of one's own genetic 
likeness, the historical importance of a blood bond between parent and 
child, and the potential property interest that an individual has in his or her 
own gametic material as reasons for the doctrine's superiority. 145 
The Genetic Contribution Doctrine was first enunciated by the Ohio 
Court of Common Pleas in Belsito v. Clark. 146 In Belsito, Shelly Belsito had 
undergone a hysterectomy; her sister, Carol, volunteered to be Shelly's ges-
tational surrogate. 147 One of the Shelly's eggs was fertilized by her hus-
band's sperm and then implanted into Carol who planned to be only an aunt 
to the child. 148 Under Ohio law, the birth mother was listed on the child's 
birth certificate; the child would also be considered illegitimate if the birth 
mother was not married to the child's genetic father. 149 Shelly and her hus-
band filed a complaint requesting that they be declared the legal parents of 
the child. 150 A complication arose, however, because under Ohio law, the 
gestational carrier of the child is the individual listed on the birth certificate 
as the child's mother, not the woman who provided the eggs and was the 
intended mother of the child. 151 Ohio had a version of the Uniform Parent-
age Act that provided that maternity could be established genetically or 
through the birth process. 152 Thus, the Ohio Court of Common Pleas had to 
formulate its rationale for deliberately forgoirig the requirement that the 
gestational mother be listed on the child's birth certificate. 
In establishing the Genetic Contribution Doctrine, the Belsito court 
specifically rejected the Intentional Parentage Doctrine as initially set forth 
144. See Belsito v. Clark, 644 N.E.2d 760, 765-66 (Ohio Misc. 2d 1994). This as-
sumption exists so long as the individuals who have been identified as the genetic parents 
have not waived their rights to become legal parents. /d. at 66. 
145. See Hill, supra note 137, at 389-94. Professor Hill from the Indiana University 
Robert H. McKinney School of Law notes, however, that while the genetic relationship 
between the gamete donor and resulting child is strong, this may be in fact due to the psycho-
logical and physical involvement of actually extracting the gametes rather than the genetic 
connection per se. /d. at 390-91. Thus, adopting Professor Hill's rationale, if an individual is 
deceased and cannot experience the psychological and physical involvement of becoming a 
donor, then perhaps the link between the genetic provider and the resulting child are not as 
strong as previously considered. 
146. 644 N.E.2d at 760. 
147. /d. at 761. 
148. /d. 
149. /d. at 762. 
150. /d. 
151. !d. Furthermore, the hospital informed the genetic mother that because the sur-
rogate sister and genetic father were not married, the resulting child would be considered 
illegitimate. !d. 
152. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3111.02 (LexisNexis 2001 ). 
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in Johnson v. Calvert. 153 The court created a two-part test for determining 
parentage based upon the historical acceptance of genetic parents as the 
legal parents. 154 First, if the sperm donor and egg donor did not waive their 
right to parentage, they were presumed the legal parents. 155 Second, if the 
female genetic provider waived her parental rights, only then would the 
surrogate be the legal mother. 156 
The two-part test enunciated in Belsito is fairly straightforward when 
applied to ART cases where the female genetic provider is seeking to be 
declared the legal parent of the resulting child. In the PGR context, howev-
er, the genetic mother will be deceased and she will not be fighting to be-
come the child's legal mother. 157 The attribution of legal parentage to genet-
ic parents establishes a number of responsibilities on the individual. 158 Just 
because an individual is a genetic provider does not necessarily mean that 
he or she has the intention to be a parent to the child, especially in the con-
text of PGR. 159 Thus, an alternative formulation of legal parentage must be 
established within the PGR context to ensure that the deceased is not a par-
ent against her will.._ while at the same time guaranteeing that the resulting 
child does have a legal parent. 
B. The Intentional Parentage Doctrine 
Unlike the Genetic Contribution Doctrine where the court examines 
the genetic connection between a potential parent and the resulting child, 
the Intentional Parentage Doctrine is applied in instances where individuals 
153. 644 N.E.2d at 764 (citing 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993)). The Belsito court noted 
that allowing "the replication of the unique genes of an individual[] should occur only with 
the consent of that individual." !d. at 766. Furthermore, when a woman donates her genetic 
material, the Belsito court views this as a surrender of basic constitutional liberties. !d. The 
court also found the Intentional Parentage Doctrine to be a circumvention of adoption laws. 
!d. at 765-66. The court noted that Ohio adoption laws required the natural mother to have an 
unpressured opportunity to surrender her parental rights. !d. at 765. The Belsito court noted 
that Johnson's Intentional Parentage Doctrine did not address those issues and further "sub-
ordinat[ed] the consent of the genetic-providing individual to the intent to procreate of the 
surrogate who intends to keep and raise the child." !d. at 766. For a further discussion of 
Johnson's formulation of the Intentional Parentage Doctrine, see discussion infra Subsection 
TII.B.2. 
154. Belsito, 644 N.E.2d at 766-67. 
155. !d. at 767 . 
. 156. !d.; see also In re Marriage of Moschetta, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 893, 900 (Ct. App. 
1994) (holding that Johnson v. Calvert would only be applied in instances where the Uni-
form Parentage Act yielded ambiguous results and when genetics and giving birth were 
present in one woman, she was the natural mother of the child). 
157. See discussion infra Section IV.A. 
158. WHAT Is A PARENT? A SOCIO-LEGAL ANALYSIS 31 (Andrew Bainham, Shelley 
Day Sclater & Martin Richards eds., 1999). 
159. See discussion irifra Section IV.A. 
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who have no biological connection with the child but who orchestrated the 
child's conception seek to be deemed the child's legal parents}60 The doc-
trine arose as a response to disputes between intended parents and surrogate 
mothers who attempted to keep babies after giving birth. 161 Advocates of the 
Intentional Parentage Doctrine argue that the intention to become a parent 
of a genetically unrelated child should be legitimized and the individual 
should be deemed the child's legal parents. 162 Not only does the doctrine 
examine the intent of an individual to become a legal parent, but courts can 
also use the doctrine to relieve someone of parenting obligations if they do 
not want to be considered a legal parent of the child. 163 
1. Intent Not to Become a Legal Parent 
In A.Z. v. B.Z., a couple entered into a contract that would have per-
mitted the wife to continue having the embryos comprised of her eggs and 
her husbands sperm implanted even if their marital relationship deteriorat-
ed.164 After the couple was divorced, but while the embryos still remained 
frozen, the husband stated that he no longer wished to become a legal parent 
to the resulting child if the wife chose to implant the remainder of the 
sperm. 165 In striking down the agreement between the former couple, the 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court explained: 
We derive from existing State laws and judicial precedent a public policy in this 
Commonwealth that individuals shall not be compelled to enter into intimate fami-
ly relationships, and that the law shall not be used as a mechanism for forcing such 
relationships when they are not desired. The policy is grounded in the notion that 
respect for liberty and privacy requires that individuals be accorded the freedom to 
decide whether to enter into a family relationship. 166 
In this instance, the husband's desire not to be a legal parent out-
weighed his wife's desire to conceive another child. 167 Furthermore, the 
court recognized that the desire to be a parent can later be revoked prior to 
160. See Hill, supra note 137, at 413-14 (noting that the intentional parents are the 
individuals who have brought together the sperm and egg and have contracted with the sur-
rogate to bear the child). 
161. See discussion infra Subsection III.B.2. 
162. See Shultz, supra note 25, at 346 (stating that "[i]f the concept of 'family' can be 
given some fluidity and enlarged to capture essential interpersonal meanings rather than 
frozen into fact-specific parameters, the creation and legitimation of parent-child bonds 
within diverse relationships could actually be seen as strengthening family ties rather than 
weakening them"). 
163. See discussion infra Subsection III.B.l. 
164. 725 N.E.2d 1051, 1054 (Mass. 2000). 
165. !d. at 1053. 
166. /d. at 1059. 
167. /d. 
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implantation of gametic material. 168 Courts that have examined the A.Z. v. 
B.Z. decision have noted that a decedent's silence, or his equivocal indica-
tions of a desire to parent posthumously, '"ought not to be construed as con-
sent. ,t69 
2. Intent to Become a Legal Parent 
Several jurisdictions throughout the United States have begun to rely 
upon parental intent as a proxy for a genetic or gestational relationship in 
determining legal parentage. 170 The California Supreme Court created a bal-
ancing test to ascertain whose intention to be the legal mother prevailed in 
the case of Johnson v. Calvert. 171 In Johnson, Crispina and Mark Calvert 
entered into a surrogacy contract with Anna Johnson whereby she agreed to 
be implanted with a preembryo comprised of the sperm of Mark and the egg 
of Crispina; Anna was genetically unrelated to the child. 172 After Anna was 
implanted with the preembryo, the relationship between the parties deterio-
rated.173 Anna threatened to refuse to surrender the child unless the Calverts 
168. !d. This case was subsequently affirmed by New Jersey in the case of J.B. v. 
MB., 783 A.2d 707 (N.J. 2001). The New Jersey court held that "contracts to enter into 
familial relationships" should not be enforced against individuals who revoke those deci-
sions. !d. at 717. 
169. Woodward v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 760 N.E.2d 257,269 (Mass. 2002) (quoting 
Schiff, supra note 115, at 951 ("When an individual has left no instructions regarding the 
posthumous use of cryopreserved gametes for procreation, silence ought not to be construed 
as consent")). 
170. Although the Intentional Parentage Doctrine was first enunciated by the Califor-
nia Supreme Court in the case of Johnson v. Calvert, courts were beginning to examine the 
role of intent several years before the Johnson decision. For example, in Adoption of Mat-
thew B., a surrogate mother who was impregnated with the father's sperm attempted to with-
draw her consent to a stepparent adoption by the father's wife following an artificial insemi-
nation procedure. 284 Cal. Rptr. 18, 21 (Ct. App. 1991 ). A California statute provided that 
the donor of semen used in the artificial insemination of a woman other than the donor's wife 
is treated in law not to be the father of the child conceived. CAL. CIV. CODE§ 7005(b) (re-
pealed 1994). In Matthew B., the court relied primarily on equitable estoppel, stating that the 
birth mother gave birth to the child with the intention, as enunciated in the surrogacy agree-
ment, that the father of the child would be the natural father. 284 Cal. Rptr. at 34. 
171. 851 P.2d 776,782 (Cal. 1993). The court found that both women had interests in 
the child, but recognized that the goal of the parties "was to bring [the couple's] child into 
the world, not for [the couple] to donate a zygote to [the surrogate, who] would not have 
been given the opportunity to gestate ... had she ... manifested her own intent to be the 
child's mother." Jd. 
172. I d. at 778. According to the terms of the surrogacy contract, the Calverts were to 
pay the ten thousand dollar for her services. ld. Additionally, the Calverts also agreed to pay 
premiums on Johnson's life insurance policy./d. 
173. !d. 
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paid her the remaining balance owed under the surrogacy agreement. 174 Both 
Anna and the Cal verts sought a court declaration of legal parentage. 175 
The court was quickly able to determine that Mr. Calvert was the legal 
father because he was genetically related to the child. 176 The Johnson court 
examined the California Uniform Parentage Act and found that technically 
both the surrogate and the intended mother had a mother-child relationship 
with the child under the terms of the Act: 177 Anna by giving birth and 
Crispina by genetics. 178 Therefore, because there essentially was a "tie" be-
tween the two women, the California Supreme Court inquired into the 
women's intentions when they entered into the surrogacy agreement. 179 The 
court held that "when the two means [genetics and gestation] do not coin-
cide in one woman, she who intended to procreate the child-that is, she 
who intended to bring about the birth of a child that she intended to raise as 
her own-is the natural mother."180 The court held that but for the Calvert's 
affirmative act of in vitro fertilization, the child would not exist. 181 The court 
further noted that the goal of the Calverts was to produce a child, not to 
donate their gametic material to the gestational surrogate. 182 
Although the Johnson court was credited with establishing the Inten-
tional Parentage Doctrine, it is important not to overlook the fact that genet-
ics played an important role in the court's determination of parentage. Had 
Crispina Calvert not provided her own eggs for fertilization and implanta-
tion, the court would not have found her to fit within the definition of "par-
174. !d. 
175. !d. 
176. Anna J. v. Mark C., 286 Cal. Rptr. 369, 378 (Ct. App. 1991). The trial court 
ruled that the Calverts were the child's "'genetic, biological, and natural'" parents, that Anna 
had no parental rights to the child, and that the surrogacy contract was enforceable. !d. at 373 
(citation omitted). The Court of Appeals affirmed and noted that Crispina's genetic contribu-
tion was equivalent with natural, and therefore legal, motherhood. !d. at 376. 
177. Johnson, 851 P.2d at 778-85. The Uniform Parentage Act, as codified by CAL. 
Clv. CODE §§ 7000-7021 provided that a "parent and child relationship 'may be established 
by proof of her having given birth to the child."' !d. at 780. 
178. Johnson, 851 P.2d at 781. The Court found that: 
[A]Ithough the Act recognizes both genetic consanguinity and giving birth as 
means of establishing a mother and child relationship, when the two means do not 
coincide in one woman, she who intended to procreate the child-that is, she who 
intended to bring about the birth of a child that she intended to raise as her own-is 
the natural mother under California law. 
!d. at 782. 
179. !d.; see also Hill, supra note 137, at 415 (arguing that the genetic relationship 
should not be accorded priority in determining who is parent in a surrogacy context because 
the child would not have been born but for the efforts of the intended parents). 
180. Johnson, 851 P.2d at 782. The court noted that the Calverts intended to raise the 
child and took all the necessary steps to effectuate this intent. !d. 
181. /d. 
182. !d. 
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ent" under the California Uniform Parentage Act. 183 Thus, genetic parentage 
was initially an important factor that California courts took into considera-
tion when ascertaining who would be the legal mother of a child conceived 
by ART in the event of a "tie." 
Several years later, in the case of In re Marriage of Buzzanca, the Cal-
ifornia Court of Appeals extended Johnson's holding to an instance where 
neither of the intended parents were genetically related to the resulting 
child. 184 In Buzzanca, both intended parents were infertile and obtained 
sperm and eggs from anonymous donors, which were then implanted into a 
surrogate through in vitro fertilization. 185 During dissolution of marriage 
proceedings, John Buzzanca asserted that because the child was genetically 
and gestationally unrelated to both him and his wife, Luanne, he should not 
have to pay child support. 186 Once the appellate court determined that Lu-
anne could establish maternity under the relevant statutes, it next had to 
determine whether the surrogate or Luanne should be declared the child's 
legal mother. 187 The Buzzanca court noted that Johnson's intentional parent-
age doctrine was not only implicated in instances where there was a "tie" 
between the gestational and genetic mother, but also whenever a child 
would not have been born "but for the efforts of the intended parents." 188 
The court noted that John and Luanne's consent to the medical procedures 
triggered the pregnancy and birth of the child and that they were therefore 
the legal parents. 189 
The Intentional Parentage Doctrine ascribes utmost significance to the 
intention of contracting individuals at the time the surrogacy agreement was 
183. Similarly, in McDonald v. McDonald, a New York Appellate Court held that 
either the gestational surrogate or the genetic parents could be considered the legal parents 
based on what party intended to raise the child. 608 N.Y.S.2d 477, 480 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1994). 
184. In reMarriage of Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280, 293 (Ct. App. 1998). 
185. !d. at 282. 
186. !d. at 282-83. 
187. !d. at 284. 
188. !d. at 291. 
189. In a dissolution custody dispute, the wife, who was the gestational, but not ge-
netic, mother was held to be the natural mother of twins, three years old at the time of trial, 
born through in vitro fertilization using a donor's eggs and the husband's sperm in McDon-
ald v. McDonald, 608 N.Y.S.2d 477,480 (App. Div. 1994). The husband contended that he 
was the only genetic and natural parent available to the children and, therefore, his claim to 
custody was superior to that of the wife by virtue of the fact that she utilized donor eggs to 
become pregnant. !d. at 479. The court relied heavily on the reasoning of the California 
Supreme Court in Johnson v. Calvert. !d. Looking to Calvert, the court noted that in a true 
egg donation situation, the intent of the parties would be controlling. !d. at 480. The court 
ordered that the wife was the natural mother of the children, even though she had no genetic 
relationship to them. !d. 
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formed. 190 The doctrine as formulated by the Johnson and Buzzanca courts 
has been adopted in virtually the same form 191 by other jurisdictions, 192 alt-
hough some have modified it slightly. 193 The Intentional Parentage Doctrine 
190. See generally CARMEL SHALEV, BIRTH POWER: THE CASE FOR SURROGACY 120-
45 (1989) (discussing the Intent Model); Shultz, supra note 25, at 297. 
191. Recently, the Connecticut Supreme Court upheld a gestational surrogacy agree-
ment where one partner in a same-sex couple was genetically unrelated to the child. Raftopol 
v. Ramey, 12 A.3d 783 (Conn. 2011). In Raftopol, a couple entered into a gestational surro-
gacy agreement with a woman who agreed to carry the couple's fetus, created from the egg 
of an anonymous donor and the sperm of one of the men. /d. at 787. The Raftopol court 
stressed the importance that the intended father obtained parental status not by having his 
name placed on the birth certificate, but by an adjudication deeming the gestational agree-
ment valid. /d. at 793. 
192. Drafters of various model rules and acts have begun to codify various compo-
nents of the parentage models. In 1973, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uni-
form State Laws promulgated the Uniform Parentage Act (UPA) to protect the rights of 
nonmarital children. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT prefatory note (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 296 
(Supp. 2006). In the debate between parentage established by biology versus intention, the 
Uniform Parentage Act sides with the Intentional Parentage Doctrine. /d. "Parent," as de-
fined by the UP A, is "an individual who has established a parent-child relationship" with the 
child. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT §102(13) (2000). A parent-child relationship is defined as the 
legal relationship between the parent and the child. /d. §102(14). A parent-child relationship 
can be established in a multitude of ways: 
[T]he woman's having given birth to the child; ... an adjudication on the woman's 
maternity; or adoption of the child by the woman; or an adjudication confirming 
the woman as a parent of a child born to a gestational mother if the agreement was 
validated under Article 8 or is unenforceable under other law. 
/d. § 20l(a). The UPA recognizes biological connection with the child as well as various 
social connections, such as marriage to the child's mother or functional parenthood, as bases 
for establishing paternity. See id. § 201 (b). The provision requires the specific consent of an 
individual to be the parent of a child; without this clearly articulated and documented con-
sent, the obligations of parenthood will not attach. In the comments to this section, the draft-
ers acknowledge that "a child born through assisted reproduction accomplished after consent 
has been voided by divorce or withdrawn in a record will have a legal mother ... however, 
the child will have a genetic, but not a legal father." /d. § 706 cmt. Section 702 provides that 
a gametic donor will not be considered a legal parent of a child conceived by ART. /d. § 702 
(stating that "[a] donor is not a parent of a child conceived by means of assisted reproduc-
tion"). Sections 706 and 707 both place an individual's intention above genetics in determin-
ing parentage. /d. §§ 706-707. Section 707 provides that if an individual originally consented 
to be a parent by ART and dies before the process begins, the deceased individual will not be 
considered a parent. /d. § 707 (stating that "[i]f an individual ... dies before placement of 
eggs, sperm, or embryos, the deceased individual is not a parent of the resulting child unless 
the deceased spouse consented in a record that if assisted reproduction were to occur after 
death, the deceased individual would be a parent of the child"). Further, the section provides 
that any children implanted and born of cryopreserved embryos after the death of their genet-
ic father shall not be considered his children, unless the father has specifically consented to 
include such children as his heirs. /d. § 707 cmt. 
193. The Tennessee Supreme Court declined to adopt a strict application of either the 
Genetic Parentage or Intentional Parentage Doctrines in assessing who would be considered 
the legal mother in a maternity dispute. In re C.K.G., C.A.G., & C.L.G., 173 S.W.3d 714, 
726 (Tenn. 2005). Instead, the court fashioned a rule that was essentially a hybrid of the 
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represents an increased judicial deference to adults' autonomous choices 
about constructing their own form of family, even in the PGR context. This 
deference represents a more open reshaping of family relationships that 
extends beyond mere biology to the very intentions and actions that accom-
pany the formation of a family. 
IV. THE INTENTIONAL PARENTAGE DOCTRINE AS APPLIED WITHIN THE 
PGRCONTEXT 
Inherent within the concepts of ART and PGR is the splitting of the 
previously unified role of the parent amongst a multitude of individuals. 194 
Motherhood, although once easy to define, 195 has become fractured into 
genetic motherhood, 196 gestational motherhood, and intentional motherhood 
within the surrogacy context. Although recent scholarly debate centers on 
whether PGR is ethically permissible, 197 hospitals are already approving 
these procedures with very little legislative or judicial guidance. 198 As a re-
sult, gametes are harvested that ultimately will be used to create human life 
without a consensus amongst hospitals as to who will be considered the 
Genetic Parentage and Intentional Parentage Doctrine. !d. at 720-24. In In re C.K.G., the 
couple, Charles and Cindy, had a preembryo comprised of Charles's sperm and an anony-
mous donor's egg implanted into Cindy's uterus, which resulted in triplets. !d. at 718. The 
couple intended to raise the children together. !d. at 716. Some years later, the relationship 
between the couple ended and Cindy filed a parentage action seeking custody and support. 
/d. Charles countered that Cindy was not a legal parent because she was genetically unrelated 
to the children. !d. Although the Tennessee Supreme Court reaffirmed the lower court's 
holding that Cindy was the legal mother of the resulting children, it declined to adopt the 
Intentional Parentage Doctrine. !d. The court created a hybrid of the two and focused on the 
unique facts of the case and: (I) the joint procreative intent of Cindy, the gestator, and 
Charles to the children's conception and birth and the fact that Cindy would be the legal 
mother; (2) the fact that Cindy gave birth to the triplets as her own, as opposed to having 
birthed them from a surrogate; and (3) the lack of another party competing with Cindy for the 
role of"mother." /d. at 733. 
194. Susan B. Apel, Cryopreserved Embryos: A Response to "Forced Parenthood" 
and the Role of Intent, 39 FAM. L.Q. 663, 672 (2005) (discussing the development of ART 
and its creation of multiple definitions of parentage); see also Shultz, supra note 25, at 299 
(stating that "[v]arious stages of the biological process can now be severed, allowing specific 
impaired aspects of the procreative process to be replaced by workable substitutes"). 
195. Andrea E. Stumpf, Note, Redefining Mother: A Legal Matrix for New Reproduc-
tive Technologies, 96 YALE L.J. 187, 187 (I 986) (stating that "[t]he legal definition of 'moth-
er' has traditionally carried an unshakeable presumption: She was the one from whose womb 
the child came"); see also UNIF. PARENTAGE AcT§ 3 (providing natural mother is the woman 
who gave birth). The comments to section 21 of the Uniform Parentage Act states that the 
drafters anticipated that issues related to who was the mother of a child would arise so rarely 
and could be addressed so easily by a judge that they left out of the 1973 statute any sort of 
guidance as to how to determine the mother-child relationship. /d. § 21 cmt. 
196. See discussion supra Section III.A. 
197. See discussion supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text. 
198. See, e.g., New York Hospital Guidelines, supra note 50. 
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legal parents of the resulting child. 199 While factors such as evidence of pre-
mortem consent to posthumous retrieval, the circumstances surrounding 
death, and a mandatory bereavement period are taken into consideration 
before a hospital approves a PGR request, hospitals do not anticipate the 
complications arising from a parentage determination, or lack thereof, with-
in the PGR context.200 
If the deceased is adjudicated to be the legal parent of the resulting 
child by way of genetic contribution, a number of serious complications will 
arise that will further incite scholars' aversion to PGR. The deceased will 
have financial obligations to the child even after death; furthermore, the 
child will be able to inherit from the deceased's estate, regardless of wheth-
er or not this was the deceased's intent.201 In contrast to the Genetic Contri-
bution Doctrine, which increases the fears of unwanted parentage,202 appli-
cation of the Intentional Parentage Doctrine to the PGR context will dually 
ensure that the deceased individual will not be subjected to the obligations 
of legal parentage while at the same time allowing those closest to the de-
ceased the opportunity to exercise their constitutional right of procreation. 
A. Harm from Unwanted Genetic Parenthood 
By its very nature, the Genetic Contribution Doctrine fails to confront 
the full complexity of the PGR issue and the multitude of factors that bear 
on the decision. It is possible for the legislature or the court system to create 
a bright-line test where the posthumously conceived children would always 
be treated as the child of the genetic parents for inheritance and other pur-
poses, regardless of the circumstances surrounding their conception. Some 
proponents of the Genetic Contribution Doctrine emphasize the unique link 
between the genetic provider and resulting child and the continuity that 
bonds them.203 Others cite the child's best interests; these scholars maintain 
it is important for the child to know his or her origins.204 Finally, others ar-
gue that the biological connection between the parent and the child yields 
instinctive care in that the genetic parent is the individual who can provide 
the child with the best possible care.205 
Applying the Genetic Contribution Doctrine in a PGR case would 
make the deceased egg provider the legal parent. However, what if the de-
199. See discussion supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text. 
200. See discussion infra Subsections IV.C.I-3. 
201. See discussion supra note 14. 
202. See discussion infra Section IV.A. 
203. See Hill, supra note 137, at 389-90. 
204. Elizabeth Bartholet, Guiding Principles for Picking Parents, 27 HARV. 
WOMEN'S L.J. 323, 327, 343 (2004). 
205. James G. Dwyer, A Taxonomy of Children's Existing Rights in State Decision 
Making About Their Relationships, II WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 845, 865, 867 (2003). 
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ceased's former husband is remarried at the time of delivery and wants the 
new spouse to be recognized as the legal mother? Or what if an infertile 
family member desires to be considered the legal mother of the child she 
intentionally created using the eggs? As noted by Ray D. Madoff of Boston 
College Law School, application of the Genetic Contribution Doctrine to the 
PGR context has the potential to interfere with the procreative wishes of 
both the living and the deceased.206 It seems unfair to declare the deceased 
woman to be the mother simply because she provided the eggs.207 Converse-
ly, it seems equally unjust to deny the living former spouse the opportunity 
to exercise his procreative liberty with the individual of his choosing. 
Moreover, application of the Genetic Contribution Doctrine runs counter to 
the 2000 Uniform Parentage Act, which provides that posthumously con-
ceived children should not be treated as children of the deceased parent.208 
In terms of inheritance law, "a person's estate cannot be distributed 
until all possible heirs are identified."209 Thus, because it is now scientifical-
ly possible to store gametic material for many years after its initial retriev-
al,210 application of the Genetic Contribution Doctrine would essentially 
make it impossible to close an estate as long as gametic material was stored. 
Moreover, some aspects of the rationale for the Genetic Contribution 
Doctrine weaken its applicability to PGR cases. Because the genetic mother 
has died before fertilization has taken place, one can no longer speak of the 
"instinctive bond"211 between her and the child or presume that she will pro-
vide the best possible care.212 Beyond that, automatically recognizing the 
genetic mother entails recognizing her family-parents, siblings, and other 
offspring-as well. If relations between those family members and the hus-
band were strained-for example, if the deceased family objected to the use 
of the eggs and birth of the child-it might be unwise, and even contrary to 
206. See MADOFF, supra note 10, at 45. Madoff notes that "few courts ... allow[] 
posthumously conceived children to be treated as the child of the predeceased parent ... if, 
first, the parent intended for his or her genetic material to be used for posthumous reproduc-
tion and, second, the child is born within a reasonable time after the parent's death." /d. 
207. For a discussion of different contexts, see Bartholet, supra note 204, at 330. 
208. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT§ 707 (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 298 (Supp. 2006). 
209. See MADOFF,supra note 10, at45. 
210. See supra Sections LA-B. 
211. I. Glenn Cohen, The Right Not To Be a Genetic Parent?, 81 S. CAL. L. REv. 
1115, 1144 (2008). Studies have shown that "a genetic father's bond with his genetic chil-
dren erodes the lesser the residential proximity, the longer they live apart, when the father no 
longer maintains a romantic relationship with the mother, and when the father takes up a 
relationship with a new partner." /d. (citing Ellen Waldman, The Parent Trap: Uncovering 
the Myth of "Coerced Parenthood" in Frozen Embryo Disputes, 53 AM. U. L. REv. 1021, 
1040-46 (2004)). 
212. See supra note 205 and accompanying text. 
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the best interests of the child, to apply the Genetic Contribution Doctrine.213 
Ruth Zafran, professor at the Radzyner School of Law in Israel, has argued 
that 
[i]t should be stressed that ... the importance of genetics [should not be discredit-
ed]. The []genetic relation is an important consideration in defining family rela-
tions [and] ... should play a significant role in determining parenthood in cases of 
coital reproduction and serve as a powerful barrier against state intervention to 
sever that relationship.Z 14 
However, the Genetic Contribution Doctrine loses some of its force in cases 
of ART, where more than two individuals bring the child into the world, and 
PGR cases where a genetic parent has died. The absence of one of the ge-
netic parents and the potential presence of a genetically-unrelated person 
assuming a parental role warrant caution of whether the Genetic Contribu-
tion Doctrine should be applied. 
B. Benefits of the Intentional Parentage Doctrine 
An emergency room doctor confronted with an urgent request for PGR 
by a grief-stricken family member will not always have ample time to as-
sess the particularities of each request. The question of who will become the 
resulting child's legal parent will probably not be one of the first issues the 
doctor addresses nor will he have time to consider the implications the de-
termination will have in different regards. However, application of the In-
tentional Parentage Doctrine to the PGR context will honor the procreative 
autonomy of the living individual while simultaneously preventing the de-
ceased from becoming a posthumous legal parent subject to the conse-
quences and financial responsibilities that parentage implies. 
Although the Intentional Parentage Doctrine has gained jurisdictional 
support,215 the theory is not without its critics. Opponents of the doctrine are 
concerned that intentional parentage subordinates biology to intent "in de-
termining the relative parental rights and obligations of the parties."216 Addi-
213. See Cohen, supra note 211, at 1135 (arguing that "there is a harm that stems 
from the unwanted existence of a child to whom one stands in the relationship of parent"). 
214. See Zafran, supra note 20, at 73 (arguing that "the Genetic Model is based on 
the exaggerated importance that Western culture ascribes to biological origins and genetic 
identity. It invokes the myth of blood relation ... and considers relation by blood ... to be 
superior to any other"). 
215. See supra notes 164--93 and accompanying text. 
216. Compare Ape I, supra note 194, at 663 (expressing concern that the Intentional 
Parentage Doctrine actually severs parent-child ties instead of creating them), with Anne R. 
Dana, Note, The State of Surrogacy Laws: Determining Legal Parentage for Gay Fathers, 18 
DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 353, 384 n.201 (2011) (noting that "some states, such as Flori-
da, Nevada, New Hampshire, and Virginia have passed statutes . . . that recognize the 
parenthood of intending parents[,] ... but these statutes all include provisions requiring that 
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tionally, challengers are concerned that application of the Intentional Par-
entage Doctrine will also allow parents of coitally-conceived children to 
avoid parental responsibilities. 217 Another concern that advocates of the Ge-
netic Contribution Doctrine have voiced about the Intentional Parentage 
Doctrine is that it interferes with the best interest of the child because it 
makes the relationship contract-based and negotiable.218 
The concerns scholars have with the Intentional Parentage Doctrine 
will actually be alleviated within the PGR context in instances where con-
sent to the procedure has not been obtained. 219 Critics are fearful of the fact 
that a party can renege on his desire to become a legal parent and will thus 
leave the child parentless.220 However, the decision to become a parent by 
intention will take effect immediately at conception and clarifies legal 
parenthood before any significant actions are taken-namely the creation of 
new life. 221 Furthermore, parentage by intent seems fair for several reasons. 
First, individuals should bear the consequences of their voluntary deci-
sions.222 Second, people who intend to create a child are more likely to act in 
that child's best interest than are those who conceive accidentally or inci-
at least one of the intending parents to be a genetic parent of the child and that the intending 
parents be married to each other"). 
217. See Austin Caster, Note, Don't Split the Baby: How the U.S. Could Avoid Un-
certainty and Unnecessary Litigation and Promote Equality by Emulating the British Surro-
gacy Law Regime, 10 CONN. PuB. INT. L.J. 477,508 (2011) (stating "if intent ruled, a biolog-
ical father who did not want a child could avoid child support in situations where birth con-
trol was ineffective"); Amy M. Larkey, Note, Redefining Motherhood: Determining Legal 
Maternity in Gestational Surrogacy Arrangements, 51 DRAKE L. REv. 605, 623-24 (2003) 
("If intent determines parenthood in cases of noncoital reproduction, will people who be-
come parents through coital means be able to sidestep parental responsibilities because 
parenthood was unintended?"). 
218. The Ohio Court of Common Pleas in Belsito v. Clark criticized the Intentional 
Parentage Doctrine by finding it to be contrary to polices of adoption and the fear that the 
parent-child relationship appears to be a negotiated one that is conditional and possibly even 
disposable. 644 N.E.2d 760, 765-66 (Ohio Misc. 2d 1994); see also Zafran, supra note 20, at 
75. 
219. Jessica Hawkins, My Two Dads: Challenging Gender Stereotypes in Applying 
California's Recent Supreme Court Cases to Gay Couples, 41 FAM. L.Q. 623,634-35 (2007) 
(stating that"[ u ]nder this gender-neutral, intent-based approach, a gay couple's intent to raise 
the child would override any claims a gestational mother may have to parental rights"). 
220. See Zafran, supra note 20, at 75. 
221. See In re Marriage of Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280, 282 (Ct. App. 1998) 
(where neither the surrogate nor the intended parents wanted the resulting child); Dana, 
supra note 216, at 383 (2011) (stating that "[b]ecause intent manifests legal parenthood prior 
to the child's birth, the state can hold the intended parents legally and financially responsible 
for the child even if they no longer wish to raise the child"). 
222. "Our society generally favors the fulfillment of individual purposes and the 
amplification of individual choice. Developments that expand the arena of voluntary pur-
poseful decision and action are strongly favored. Our political and cultural traditions empha-
size individual liberty, particularly in central arenas of personal life, such as reproduction." 
See Shultz, supra note 25, at 327. 
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dentally.223 Finally, determination of legal parental status before the child is 
actually born "clarifies adult-child relationships from the beginning of the 
child's life" and prevents emotional and arduous litigation after the child is 
bom.224 
For some time now, courts and scholars have generally approved of 
the Functional Parentage Doctrine as a way to recognize the important rela-
tionships children foster with individuals who function as their legal parents 
but who lack the legal status. 225 The Functional Parentage Doctrine focuses 
on the relationship between the child and genetically unrelated individual 
after the child is born. 226 By contrast, the Intentional Parentage Doctrine 
allows an individual to be declared a legal parent of the child at the moment 
of the child's birth, absent any inquiry into genetic contribution or function-
al actions.227 
For instance, if the PGR procedure is performed on a deceased woman 
who in fact did not want to procreate posthumously, application of the In-
tentional Parentage Doctrine would relieve her and her estate of the legal 
and financial obligations that would accompany legal parentage had a Ge-
netic Contribution Doctrine applied.228 Conversely, if in fact the deceased 
woman had wanted to procreate posthumously, application of the Intention-
al Parentage Doctrine would protect her reproductive autonomy.229 
A closer look at several situations of requests for PGR may thus shed 
light on how conceptions of parentage within the ART and PGR context 
must be viewed. The scenarios demonstrate the various constitutional ten-
sions that are at play in a PGR request while detailing how the Intentional 
223. See ELIZABETH BARTHOLET, FAMILY BONDS: ADOPTION, INFERTILITY, AND THE 
NEW WORLD OF CHILD PRODUCTION 81 (rev. ed. 1999) (stating that "there is no reason to 
think that adoptive parents pose more of a risk than biologically linked parents do. Indeed, 
the fact that adoptive parents have consciously chosen parenthood would seem more than 
enough to compensate for any difficulties that might be inherent in adoptive parenting" (em-
phasis omitted)). Furthermore, some scholars have argued: 
Protecting the child's welfare by banning posthumous use of sperm would protect 
the child by preventing it from being born. ... Surely being born to a single parent 
or when one or both progenitors are dead does not make a child's life so painful or 
stressful that being born amounts to wrongful life. 
Robertson, supra note 35, at 1040. See also Dana, supra note 216, at 383 (stating that "[i]t is 
arguable that this method provides children with the "best and most committed" parents, 
given that those who performed the major tasks in creating the child exercised a deep desire 
for the child"). 
224. Alexa E. King, Solomon Revisited: Assigning Parenthood in the Context of 
Collaborative Reproduction, 5 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 329, 370 (1995). 
225. See supra Section III. B. 
226. See discussion supra Section III.B. 
227. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT art. 8 (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 360-70 (Supp. 
2006). 
228. See discussion supra Section IV.A. 
229. See discussion supra Subsection II.A.l. 
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Parentage Doctrine simultaneously respects the autonomy of the living and 
the dead. 
C. Defining Parenthood in PGR Cases: Applying the Intentional Parentage 
Doctrine 
Reproductive technology is currently on the verge of a medical break-
through that will soon permit a woman's eggs to be posthumously harvested 
from her body.230 Some scholars view the potential for female PGR as an 
opportunity for a family to continue the bloodline and pay tribute to the 
deceased.231 Contrarily, other scholars view the extraction of eggs from a 
dead woman as forced motherhood, potentially in violation of her right not 
to procreate. 232 
Overcoming the issue of unobtained consent presents a problem to 
spouses, significant others, and family members requesting the PGR proce-
dure after a loved one has passed away. Much like petitions for the use of a 
deceased's cryopreserved gametes, a spouse or a family member could 
maintain that the individual would have wanted children and manifested 
some outward indicia of this desire. 233 However, hospital staffs that have 
been presented with this issue have noted a lack of outward indicia of con-
sent as well as potential conflicts of interest amongst family members of the 
deceased.234 The husband's claim that his wife would have wanted retrieval 
could be biased by his own desire to have children. Contrarily, parents of 
the deceased and other family members may be similarly biased in that they 
want to continue the family line or replace the deceased child. 235 While 
230. See, e.g., John A. Gibbons, Comment, Who's Your Daddy?: A Constitutional 
Analysis of Post-Mortem Insemination, 14 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & PoL'Y 187, 190 (1997) 
(describing the discovery that sperm could be cryogenically frozen and later used for repro-
duction as a "medical breakthrough"); see also MADOFF, supra note 10, at 46. 
231. Laurence C. Nolan, Posthumous Conception: A Private or Public Matter?, 11 
BYU J. PUB. L. I, 23 (1997) (asserting that "[f]or the donee, to have a child who is genetical-
ly-related to the donor may ease the grieving process and aid in the donee's adjustment to life 
without the donor"). 
232. See Elliott, supra note 19, at 63-64 (discussing the judiciary's recognition of a 
decedent's right of reproductive choice in the face of"forced procreation" after death). 
/d. 
233. See supra Subsection II.A.I. 
234. See, e.g., New York Hospital Guidelines, supra note 50: 
A reasonable expectation that the recently deceased would consent to having his 
sperm used for procreation would best be determined by his actions and discus-
sions prior to death with respect to intended pregnancy .... The premorbid wishes 
of the ... sperm donor should be weighed significantly in making decisions as to 
whether to retrieve that individual's sperm for use in artificial conception. 
235. The Medical College at Cornell University takes into the consideration the fact 
that many of the individuals making PGR requests may have competing reasons for so doing. 
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scholars have advocated for an inquiry into whether independent grounds 
exist for believing that the individual would have consented to retrieval, 236 
these concerns about becoming a parent after death could be alleviated by 
the application of the Intentional Parentage Doctrine to the PGR request. 
The Intentional Parentage Doctrine has been applied in two instances: 
where it is impossible to clearly establish parentage under any statutory or 
constitutional principle as well as in instances where a genetic and gesta-
tional relationship does not coincide in the same person.237 The following 
scenarios are a representation of situations where emergency room doctors 
in the United States were confronted with emergency requests to perform 
the PGR procedure. All of the scenarios share a common plot: a woman is 
either pronounced brain dead or is in a persistent vegetative state and an 
individual related to the woman desires to harvest her eggs for later use. 
Furthermore, there is no evidence as to whether the woman would have 
desired to be a parent posthumously or would have consented to the PGR 
procedure. At this point, the stories will divert, depending on the identity of 
the individual requesting the PGR procedure and the uses of the harvested 
gametic material. The question that arises in all of these scenarios is who 
should be declared the legal mother of the child: the deceased genetic moth-
er, the intended mother, neither, or both? 
1. A Woman Dies and Her Former Spouse Requests Retrieval of Her 
Eggs 
Suppose that at the time of Chen Aida Ayash's death,238 she had been 
married but had never expressed any wishes as to whether or not she desired 
to procreate posthumously. Her husband, however, has always wanted to 
/d. Thus, Cornell's guidelines state that "[a]ny detectable conflict among interested parties 
should be a contraindication to [PGR]." /d. 
236. See Strong, supra note 12, at 351 (stating that "[t]he absence of explicit prior 
consent does not make the reasons irrelevant, provided the person's wishes can reasonably be 
inferred"); L. 'cannold, Who Owns a Dead Man's Sperm?, 30 J. MED. ETHICS 386, 386 
(2004). Cannold writes: 
/d. 
[A] legitimate decision to grant a sperm seeker access to a dead man's sperm needs 
to be grounded in a belief that the seeker's access and use of the sperm would not 
contravene the dead man's autonomy but-through doing what "he would have 
wanted"-extend it. Such a decision would also need to be based on a clear con-
viction that in attempting to gain access to the dead man's sperm, the seeker is not 
using the dead man as a means to their own ends, but both expressing her love for 
him and attempting, by enabling the birth of his genetic offspring, to pay tribute to 
him. 
237. Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d. 776, 782 (Cal. 1993); see also discussion supra 
Subsection III.B.2. 
238. See supra text accompanying notes 1-6. 
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have children and seeks to have her eggs harvested, fertilized with his 
sperm, and implanted into a gestational surrogate. 
There are numerous reasons why a man might want to use PGR in or-
der to harvest his deceased wife's eggs in order to have a child. For exam-
ple, a man may believe that using his deceased wife's eggs would be a way 
to pay tribute to her.239 A man may also believe that raising his wife's child 
would help him cope with the loss of his wife.240 Furthermore, he may want 
to know "'the genetic origins of [his] child. "'241 If the husband uses his de-
ceased wife's eggs, he will presumably know much more about the resulting 
child's family and genetic history than if he used donated eggs.242 
Generally, if a woman dies, her husband243 would have some legal 
rights surrounding the circumstances of her death, such as the ability to con-
sent to the removal of her organs for donation and the disposition of her 
body.244 Furthermore, Chen's fictional husband also possesses the funda-
mental right to procreate.245 Thus, his request for retrieval, insemination, and 
implantation is an exercise of his constitutional reproductive freedom.246 
The issue that arises is whether the man's freedom to procreate should pre-
vail despite an absence of his wife's reasonably inferred consent.247 Unlike 
the case of Davis v. Davis, the gametes in this instance will be used by 
Chen's fictional husband and not donated to an unknown party.248 Further-
more, with application of the Intentional Parentage Doctrine, it could not be 
argued that the deceased Chen would be in doubt as to her parental status of 
239. Cf Devon D. Williams, Comment, Over My Dead Body: The Legal Nightmare 
and Medical Phenomenon of Posthumous Conception Through Postmortem Sperm Retrieval, 
34 CAMPBELL L. REV. 181, 199-200 (2011) (arguing that a child of a deceased man would 
have peace of mind knowing that he had a genetic connection with his mother's deceased 
husband and that he was conceived from a loving relationship). 
240. See id. at 199. 
241. /d. (citation omitted). 
242. See id. at 200. 
243. But see MODEL ACT GOVERNING ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECH. §102(21) 
(2008), available at apps.americanbar.org/family/committees/artmodelact.pdf (approved by 
the A.B.A. Family Law Section in 2007 and the House of Delegates in 2008). The word 
"spouse" assumes the existence of marriage. However, under the Model Act, '"[!]ega! 
spouse"' means an individual married to another, or who has a legal relationship to another 
that this state accords rights and responsibilities equal to, or substantially equivalent to, those 
of marriage." /d. This definition of "spouse" allows individuals living in a state that recog-
nizes domestic partnerships or civil unions to be considered legal spouses for ART purposes. 
See id. 
244. See Greer et al., supra note 13, at 281-82. 
245. See discussion supra Subsection II.A.l. 
246. See discussion supra Subsection II.A.l. 
247. See discussion supra Subsections II.A.1-2; see also Strong, supra note 12, at 349 
(arguing that the "freedom not to beget and freedom not to gestate are valuable in part be-
cause these freedoms are important for directing the course of one's life"). 
248. See supra notes 83-96 and accompanying text. 
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the resulting child because she would not be considered a legal parent under 
the Intentional Parentage Doctrine.249 An argument could be made that 
Chen's fictional former husband has other areas of procreation available to 
him, but the unique facts surrounding PGR-the fact that the woman he 
desired to procreate with is dead--counters this argument.250 
Scholars that have considered PGR requests have given the most 
weight to those from spouses and have noted that these requests have the 
potential to cause disagreements between the spouse and the other family 
members of the deceased. 251 However, application of the Intentional Parent-
age Doctrine to this context has the ability to relieve many of these difficul-
ties. 
First, if the request for PGR is granted, the husband will have to find a 
gestational surrogate to carry the preembryo formed from the deceased 
wife's egg and the sperm of either himself or of an anonymous donor.252 
Because it is the husband who is deliberately seeking a surrogate in order to 
create the child, he will be considered the legal parent of the resulting 
child.253 Conversely, because the deceased wife had died before her eggs 
were even harvested for the procedure, it cannot be said that "but for" her 
efforts, the child would have been conceived and born.254 Therefore, under 
the Intentional Parentage Doctrine, the deceased wife and egg donor will 
not be considered a legal parent; in terms of inheritance laws, the resulting 
child will not be able to inherit from her nor any members of her family. 
2. A Woman Dies and Her Significant Other Requests Retrieval of Her 
Eggs 
The main difference between this example and the previous one is that 
the couple in this instance lacks a traditional marital relationship. Some-
times a request to retrieve the eggs of a woman is made by a significant 
other or a fiance_l55 It might be asked whether absence of a marital relation-
249. Contra Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 604 (Tenn. 1992), wherein the court 
noted that Junior Davis "would face a lifetime of either wondering about his parental status 
or knowing about his parental status but having no control over it." 
250. In determining whether the right to procreate trumped the right not to procreate, 
courts should consider whether the party who wants to procreate has alternative means of 
procreating. See supra note I 00 and accompanying text. 
251. See discussion supra Section N.B; see also Greer et a!., supra note 13, at 281 
("In this case, the retrieval and fertilization of the eggs of the incompetent patient could raise 
family disputes over who had the power to control their use, but if fertilized with the sperm 
of the husband, his decision would control."). 
252. See discussion supra Section III.B. 
253. See discussion supra Subsection II.B.2. 
254. See In reMarriage ofBuzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280, 291 (Ct. App. 1998). 
255. See supra note 49 and accompanying text. 
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ship makes it ethically justifiable to ca~ out the request.256 It is possible to 
argue that the lack of marriage does not, in and of itself, make the retrieval 
unethical.257 For instance, if family members had previously talked to the 
deceased, posthumous retrieval would promote her freedom to make deci-
sions about procreation after death. Also, respect for the reproductive free-
dom of the deceased's significant other is also being taken into considera-
tion.258 The law recognizes that families are often formed outside of mar-
riage;259 therefore, someone who had explicit permission for PGR and utili-
zation of the gametes might have a valid claim against the institution that 
denied a request. There is legal precedent for cases in which sperm was 
given premortem to a significant other.260 The reasons given above for re-
specting a husband's freedom to procreate would also apply to a significant 
other or fiance. Because a number of the reasons for valuing procreative 
freedom apply to single as well as married people, there are grounds for 
respecting procreative freedom regardless of whether the persons are mar-
ried. 
3. A Woman Dies and Her Family Members Request Retrieval of Her 
Eggs 
Now suppose a United States court is confronted with a situation akin 
to that of the original story of Chen Aida Ayash, where a woman is rendered 
dead and her parents request the retrieval of her eggs for use by either the 
parents or another family member. 261 Most hospitals that have enacted pro-
256. See Devon D. Williams, Over My Dead Body: The Legal Nightmare and Medi-
cal Phenomenon of Posthumous Conception Through Postmortem Sperm Retrieval, 38 
CAMPBELL L. REv. 181, 192 (2012) (arguing that "it is much easier to prove the requisite 
consent when the couple was married ... a presumption against [PGR] surfaces when the 
couple is not married"). One scholar has even stated that "the non-married person has no 
legal right to the decedent's sperm. Everyone agrees to that." Norman Bauman, Law Pro-
vides Little Guidance for Postmortem Sperm Retrieval, UROLOGY TIMES, Oct. 1998, at 21, 
22. 
257. For instance, in Eisenstadt v. Baird, the Supreme Court recognized that the right 
of privacy and, by extension, the right to procreate was available to the individual as well as 
to the marital couple. 405 U.S. 438, 454-55 (1972). The Court noted that "[i]f the right of 
privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from 
unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the 
decision whether to bear or beget a child." !d. at 453. 
258. See discussion supra Subsection II.A.I. 
259. See, e.g., Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) (stating that "[n]or has the 
law refused to recognize those famil[ies] ... unlegitimized by a marriage ceremony"). 
260. See Hall v. Fertility Inst. of New Orleans, 647 So. 2d 1348, 1349-50, 1352-53 
(La. Ct. App. 1994); see also Hecht v. Superior Court of L.A., 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d 222, 223-24, 
227 (Ct. App. 1996) (depublished) (finding that sperm bequeathed to a decedent's significant 
other should be granted to her and the children of the decedent had no cognizable interest). 
261. See supra notes 1-6 and accompanying text. 
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tocol to deal with PGR requests have chosen to recognize the wishes of a 
spouse or significant other over those of the deceased's parents or family 
members.262 Furthermore, hospitals within the United States have expressed 
their concerns over allowing a family member other than a spouse or fiance 
from utilizing the deceased's gametes for reproductive purposes.263 How-
ever, where courts have been inclined to balance the procreative desires of 
the husband or spouse against the unknown wishes of his wife or significant 
other, it seems fair to conclude that courts would be less receptive to re-
quests from family members because the right to procreate using the de-
ceased's gametes appears to have more significance to a spouse or signifi-
cant other than to a family member.264 Furthermore, when the woman's eggs 
are harvested, they will not be fertilized with the sperm of her spouse or 
significant other. Rather, it may be a family member's husband, significant 
other, or sperm donor who provides his sperm for the fertilization process. 
CONCLUSION 
Scientific developments and an altering concept of what it means to 
constitute a family have made it possible to use PGR and ART to create 
families. While this is a positive change, there are complex challenges that 
accompany this revolution. One of the most significant of those challenges 
is determining parentage in cases of PGR. In the PGR context, one of the 
genetic parents is dead and an additional person must participate in the crea-
tion of the family. At the same time, legal parentage has many obligations 
that accompany it and the deceased's desire to take on these additional re-
sponsibilities posthumously may not be known. 
Although not perfected, the medical technology that would make 
posthumous egg retrieval possible is on its way to becoming a reality. Nev-
ertheless, with rapid advances in medical technology, PGR has not yet been 
the subject of case law, legislation, or regulation. This is most likely due to 
the fact that the various definitions of parentage within these situations are 
complex, controversial, and in a state of flux. But these difficulties make it 
obvious that a regulatory regime is essential. The absence of such a scheme 
will continue to promote inconsistency in determinations of parentage, 
which will lead to excessive litigation and legal woes in the future. 
262. See e.g., New York Hospital Guidelines, supra note 50 ("The wife is the individ-
ual who is best capable of determining the deceased man's intentions for conception and is 
best able to give procedural consent. ... Next of kin are typically empowered to provide 
consent for other anatomic gifts, consistent with the presumed intent of the deceased."). 
263. See id. 
264. !d. ("The wife should be the only individual for whom these sperm could be 
considered for conception .... [T]hird party designation of specimens for use by an individu-
al who is not the wife is to be discouraged."). 
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The Intentional Parentage Doctrine will ensure that the child born as a 
result of PGR has at least one legal parent while at the same time making 
sure that the deceased, her family, and her estate will not be burdened with 
the financial obligations that accompany legal parentage. Furthermore, 
adoption of the Intentional Parentage Doctrine will provide an answer to the 
baffling question posed in Astrue v. Capato of whether or not a child con-
ceived after the death of a gamete provider is entitled to the same benefits as 
a child conceived during the deceased's lifetime. Unlike the other models of 
parentage that currently exist, the Intentional Parentage Doctrine captures 
the complexity of the situation in which PGR requests are made and has the 
flexibility to recognize the needs and interests of all of the potential individ-
uals involved. 

